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ABSTRACT

THE RELUCTANT COLONIZATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 1833-1851:
A STUDY OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN THE SOUTHWEST ATLANTIC

By: Shannon Warnick
For the Degree, Master of Arts in History
University of Richmond
December 2008
Dr. John L. Gordon, Jr., Thesis Director

After the Napoleonic Wars, British leaders increasingly objected to large
burdensome formal annexations. Hence, when South American markets opened in the
1820s British leaders considered using nearby island bases to ward off regional rivals.
Britain therefore occupied the Falkland Islands in 1833. Despite governing the world’s
strongest industrial and naval power however, British leaders neglected the Falklands’
progress as a colony from 1833 to 1851. Dogmatic faith in “efficiency” and free trade in
the 1840s led to modest commercial progress by largely unfettered private interests in the
islands, but led to little improvement in defense or society. This study uses government
manuscripts, newspapers, and accounts by sailors, merchants and diplomats to examine
how the debate over formal annexations and the preference of free trade in foreign and
colonial affairs led to the reluctant and poorly executed colonization of the Falklands.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
As Paul Kennedy pointed out in his work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,
Britain enjoyed unrivalled relative power in the world in political, military and economic
might in the first half of the nineteenth century after the fall of Napoleon. 1 Though
domestic unrest flared up in the form of riots and radical political movements, pragmatic
politicians warded off the violent political revolutions that threatened many Continental
monarchies. The British government, encouraging industrial enterprise and boasting the
world’s strongest navy, created an opportunistic atmosphere for merchants at home and
abroad. As a result, British traders and colonizers brazenly settled in some of the world’s
most distant outposts. British leaders, seeking to create an image of reserved firmness in
foreign and imperial affairs, encouraged such enterprises, so long as they did not draw
Britain into formal annexations or other “imperial” acts. Although many considered the
formal empire a symbol of British might, many others increasingly saw it as burdensome
and problematic. In fact, Britons of the period rarely used the word “imperialism” in
reference to their actions abroad because it connoted bellicosity, brutishness and
Bonapartism. 2 It followed that sentiment supported global commercial expansion as the

1

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 151-154.
Britain’s power was relatively greater than that of the other Western Powers following the Napoleonic
Wars, largely due to her rapid industrialization, steady population growth and strong navy, while her
political and economic competitors recovered more slowly from the struggles of the Napoleonic era. In
other words, Britain held more military and commercial strength in comparison to the competitors she
faced in the West, but materially, she did not noticeably eclipse the wealth and dominance of other world
powers in other historical epochs.
2

Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Great Britain (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 8. Ironically, many saw the British as bullies anyway.

1

2

cheapest and most peaceable way to extend British ideals and culture. Polarized opinions
about empire, administration and trade split foreign and colonial policy-makers. Many
proponents of maintaining the empire remained wary of wantonly granting selfgovernment or giving commercial agents abroad too much leeway. Thus, radicals began
to reproach older mercantile policies and the acquisition of large territories as inefficient
and expensive to domestic taxpayers who funded colonial annexations. Some clamored
for reforms in colonial administration, with some advocating total separation of the
colonies from Britain. Nevertheless, one could rightly argue that the pre-1800 policies of
formal annexation and mercantilism grew undesirable to most British leaders and
theorists in the first half of the nineteenth century.
In the early 1820s, the United Provinces of the River Plate (later named
Argentina) gained political and economic independence from a greatly weakened Spanish
throne, despite the attempts of Metternich and other conservatives at the Congress of
Vienna to return to the status quo. Other South American nations such as Peru, Chile and
Brazil broke from their former Iberian rulers during or just after the upheavals of the
Napoleonic Wars. As revolution and liberalism took hold in cities such as Rio de
Janiero, Montevideo and Buenos Aires and other South American outposts, so did
opportunities for British traders to open new markets. After 1823, as will be discussed
later, Britain refrained from taking formal possessions in South America because of its
outward support for the Monroe Doctrine. Governments promoted informal imperialism

3

through “free trade” so as to more cheaply sustain commercial, political and cultural
dominance in the southwest Atlantic. 3
C. A. Bodelsen, W. P. Morrell and Paul Knaplund, writing mostly in the first half
of the twentieth century about the early and mid-Victorian empire, based their
assumptions heavily upon Britain’s formal empire. They generally agreed that the
empire’s administrators in the first half of the nineteenth century conceded the
inevitability of separation from formal colonies because of cost. They argued that
successive governments in this era were reluctant toward formal expansionism.
Therefore, mainstream historiography often equated imperialism with formal territorial
expansion, and considered much of the period before 1870 “anti-imperial.” One must not
mistake restraint in formal annexation for the cessation of imperialism, however.
Historians of the empire writing in the two decades after the Second World War
broadened their definitions of British imperialism before 1870. British imperial activity
occurred often, but developed more around diplomatic and military policies that
promoted British commercial and cultural supremacy abroad rather than annexations.
John Gallagher’s and Ronald Robinson’s article “The Imperialism of Free Trade” (1953)
further reshaped historiographical discourse concerning the study of continuity in British

3

Birdsall S. Viault, English History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 261-262. “Free Trade” was a
British social and political movement that gained momentum following Napoleon’s downfall. “Free
traders” called for the abolition of tariffs, especially the Corn Laws, which they said only protected wealthy
agricultural interests, drove food prices higher for urban working classes and severely inhibited the
industrial and commercial classes’ ability to compete and trade with foreign competitors. Sir Robert Peel’s
Government made free trade doctrine official for Britain after her inability or unwillingness to aid the Irish
during the famine of 1845-1846 showed the need for lower food prices. Parliament repealed the Corn
Laws in 1846, leading to the split of Peelites from the protectionist Tories and Peel’s loss of the prime
minister’s post. Lord John Russell’s succeeding Government would bolster Peelite reforms by repealing
the cumbersome Navigation Acts in 1849, furthering the move to open colonial and international free trade.

4

expansionism in the pre-1870 period. By rejecting V. I. Lenin’s and J. A. Hobson’s
notions of concrete “imperial” and “anti-imperial” eras, Gallagher’s and Robinson’s
revision allowed more flexible explanation of Britain’s continuous global expansion
before 1870.4 They argued that during this supposed “anti-imperial” period, that is, the
early and mid- Victorian era, Britain annexed, occupied or maintained many small
peripheral stations and used diplomatic pressure and small military actions to protect her
overseas interests.5
As Britain’s empire dissolved in the 1960s and 1970s, the prevailing majority of
studies of the empire assumed early and mid-Victorian British imperialism included
informal dominance. They also regularly criticized imperialism in both the formal and
informal sense. The confusion and disillusionment of Britain’s de-colonization period
inspired a wealth of studies about mistakes in early policies or imperial actions that led to
difficulties in ruling crown possessions after the mid-nineteenth century. D.C.M. Platt’s
“The Role of the British Consular Service in Overseas Trade 1825-1914” (1963) and
Helen Taft Manning’s “Who Ran the British Empire 1830-1850?” (1965) examined the
confusion caused by ministerial overlap and poor coordination of foreign policy and

4

John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” Economic History Review, New
Series 6, no.1 (1953): 1-2. They maintain that many historians misinterpreted the lack of large formal
annexations as “anti-imperialism,” when in reality a rash of small annexations and informal interference in
other nations’ economies, politics and culture should be considered as continuous imperial activity. Also,
in this study, “informal empire” will be used to describe any area dominated by Britain in politics,
economics, culture or all three, without becoming a formal possession.

5

Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” 2-3. They point out that between 1815 and
1851, Britain annexed, occupied and maintained Gibraltar, New Zealand, Labuan, Natal, and Hong Kong.
Giving up island bases like Gibraltar (obtained in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht) would undoubtedly have
weakened their ability to move in and out of the Mediterranean. They also added Oudh, Kowloon, Lagos,
and several other peripheral bases on and near Africa and Asia to sustain naval presence in nearby seas.

5

imperial government. In the 1970s, Kenneth Bourne and H.S. Ferns enhanced this
dialogue by proving that Victorian foreign policy supported the creation of informal
empire in order to avoid the costliness and internal strife associated with overseeing large
formal possessions. They asserted that though British leaders usually opposed formal
annexation in the first half of the nineteenth century, they did not categorically deny its
utility. Ferns and Peter Winn particularly adapted these lines of reasoning to Argentina
and Uruguay, where the British took pains to avoid formal annexation during the collapse
of the Spanish American empire. Further support for these themes arrived in James
Scobie’s work Argentina: A City and a Nation, which illustrated the economic
dominance of Britain, France and the United States over the markets of Buenos Aires,
Montevideo and the Paraná River through use of free trade doctrine after the 1820s.
Argentina’s resounding defeat in the Falklands at the hands of Britain in 1982
reinvigorated literature in both the Americas and in Britain over interventionism in the
southwest Atlantic. The dispute over sovereignty in the Falklands became a lightning rod
for those studying Britain’s search for identity in a world dominated politically by the
United States and the Soviet Union. A wave of scornful works by Argentine and other
Latin American historians contemporaneously chided Europe’s and the United States’
political and economic domination of South America over the last two centuries. British
sympathizers found justifications for taking and retaining ownership over the Falklands
in 1833, while Argentine sympathizers emphatically pointed out patterns of military,
political and economic incursion into territories they considered their own after their
independence. For instance, Max Hastings’s and Simon Jenkins’s The Battle for the

6

Falklands and Peter Calvert’s article “Sovereignty and the Falkland Islands” (both
published in 1983) examined more than just the course of the sovereignty dispute. They
exposed the infighting in the British government during the empire’s disintegration and
Margaret Thatcher’s need to bolster British pride by protecting the few small possessions
Britain still retained in the early 1980s. Argentine historians and supporters Ernesto
Fitte, Carlos Escudé and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse have consistently argued that the
Falklands should be returned to Argentina as part of Britain’s de-colonization process.
More recently, in Malvinas o Falklands? (2000) Conrado Bullrich continued the trend of
berating the British for their reticence to cede the islands to Argentina.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, historians of the last two decades have
dwelt upon the pitfalls of maintaining empires, both formal and informal. They often
invoke the doctrine of self-determination or refer to global interdependence as reasons to
end such practices. Not surprisingly, studies of the British empire of the early and midVictorian era have taken on a cautionary tone since the United States emerged, as
Kennedy might say, with the world’s strongest “relative power.” They hint that current
American foreign policies and economic activities reflect the same poor planning and
governance seen in the British-dominated world of the first half of the nineteenth century.
Andrew Porter’s edited work The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume III: The
Nineteenth Century (1999) and Bernard Porter’s The Absent-Minded Imperialists (2004)
argue that Britain’s relatively unrivalled status in the immediate post-Napoleonic world
caused her to over-extend her military, colonial and diplomatic services, even when many
at home identified little with (or cared little about) their colonial brethren. Their studies

7

show that British diplomatic and commercial expansionism in the period 1815-1870
tended to compound, rather than alleviate, domestic political and economic distress.
These general studies of the empire by Andrew Porter and Bernard Porter reinforce
earlier works by Barry Gough, David Rock and Mary Cawkell that particularly examine
the Falklands and British activities in the southwest Atlantic in the Victorian era.
Gough’s “The British Reoccupation and Colonization of the Falkland Islands, or
Malvinas, 1832-1843” (1990) and follow-up work The Falkland Islands/Malvinas: The
Contest for Empire in the South Atlantic (1992) emphasize the agency of naval men and
ground-level diplomats in recognizing the need to keep and maintain the Falklands, but
points out missed opportunities to develop the islands to best advantage both Britain and
the islanders. Cawkell’s 2001 study The History of the Falkland Islands accentuates, as
does Gough, mismanagement and hesitancy by British leadership in the first two decades
of British occupation that impeded the Falklands’ economic and cultural growth. Their
works enhance a central theme of this study that strategic territorial occupation with little
forethought often leads to stunted local colonial development.
A look at the larger framework of British incursions into South America in the
first half of the nineteenth century helps explain the haphazard takeover of the islands and
the reluctant and protracted colonization process they suffered from 1833 until after midcentury. After 1815, South America became one of the newest and most intriguing sets
of markets to open for British industrial trading interests. But in order to more fully
explain British motives in the southwest Atlantic, one must discuss general British
reactions to the crumbling of Iberian-American empires, trends in British government and

8

changing British views of imperialism and liberalism in that era. An exhaustive
examination of the dissolution of South American empires will not be attempted, but
reference to these revolutions will be made as they influenced British actions, particularly
in the convulsive new South American states of Brazil and Argentina. As a reaction to
political turmoil in these locales, the Royal Navy and British policy-makers took cautious
and calculated political and strategic measures to maintain Britain’s commercial
dominance. However, these aspirations came with a price. As the costs of protecting
British interests grew, many in the navy and in government began to look at the prospects
of island stations as more suitable than turbulent coastal ports like Rio de Janiero, Buenos
Aires and Montevideo. In response to Argentine, French and American actions, and
encouraged by the advice of diplomats, surveyors, merchants and seamen, the British
took over the Falkland Islands in 1833. No cohesive or expedient government plan for
the islands’ progress accompanied Britain’s preemptive actions. As a result,
governmental reluctance towards developing the Falklands led to little benefit for Britain
or the islands between 1833 and 1851.

9

Figure 1: Falkland Islands

Source: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/south-america/falkland-islands

Figure 2: South America

Source: http://ahoy.tk-jk.net/macslog/TheBattleoftheRiverPlate.html

CHAPTER TWO
BRITISH EXPANSIONISM
Informal Imperialism and Free Trade in the Southwest Atlantic
British eagerness to trade with Brazil and the newly formed United Provinces of
the Rio de la Plata (later known simply as “Argentina”) led to an ambiguous political and
trade relationship with Spain that discouraged overt military interventions by the British. 1
While trying to avoid openly endorsing violent liberal revolutions in Europe, British
leaders accepted liberalism in South America with restraint as a way to gain access to
new markets. They had reason for restraint. During the Napoleonic Wars and shortly
afterwards, the Royal Navy had acted as Portugal‟s protector by escorting Portuguese
ships to the Brazilian Empire. After Napoleon‟s invasion of Spain in 1808, Britain also
used its navy to help guard Spain‟s American empire while backing intrigues to restore
its monarchy. Britain dismayed conservatives on the Continent, however, by refusing to
join official alliances after 1815.2 Kenneth Bourne points out that British foreign
secretaries found the idea of permanent allies in this era “constitutionally and practically
inconvenient,” as it would lead to scrutiny from both parliament and public opinion. 3
The British could ill afford to actively promote liberalism in Europe after 1815 for fear of
1

David Rock, Argentina 1516-1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 75. Britain wanted to aid Spanish monarchists besieged by
Napoleon in Cadiz 1810-1812 and after 1815 to deter future French aggression. In fact, the Duke of
Wellington sent a force to bolster the small garrison at Cadiz during the siege. Note: this study will often
make reference to Buenos Aires, the main Argentine power center in the first half of the nineteenth century.

2

C. K. Webster, ed., Britain and the Independence of Latin America 1812-1830: Select Documents from
the Foreign Office Archives (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 9. Continental conservatives like the
Austrian Klemens von Metternich often questioned British commitment to conservative ideals after 1815.

3

Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 8.
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11

ruining relations with Spain and Portugal. But budding liberalism and unrest in Iberian
America led to hopes of accessing newly opening markets. Creole and native uprisings
forced João IV to return to Portugal from Brazil, where he had been in exile since 1808.
In 1822 João‟s son Pedro I, crown prince and regent of Brazil, broke with the Portuguese
cortes over plans to restore mercantilism in Brazil. In 1825, with the help of former
British and French naval and army officers, Pedro put down the remaining Portuguese
absolutists and solidified a limited monarchy in Brazil friendly to British trade. 4 Hoping
for similar results in former Spanish domains, the British determined to let liberalism take
its course in the Rio de la Plata region. British diplomats cautiously endorsed free trade
by their own consuls and merchants and refused to assist in the overthrow of any newly
proclaimed South American nations.5
Proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States and of the Polignac
Memorandum between Britain and France also aided British trade, diplomacy and naval
dominance in the region. The Monroe Doctrine (1823) meant to close the Western
Hemisphere to further European colonization or re-colonization by Russia, Spain, Britain
or France. It declared that any such acts would be treated as a threat to United States
security. The old world generally viewed the announcement as American pretension.
Despite their disdain, few in central or eastern Europe had enough interest or naval power
to exploit South America. Russia was chiefly interested in the northwestern part of North
America. Moreover, the development of the new limited monarchy in Brazil left Spain as
4

Mark A. Burkholder and Lyman L. Johnson, Colonial Latin America (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990), 313-314.

5

Webster, Britain and the Independence of Latin America 1812-1830, 20-22.

12

the main continental power trying to regain lost colonies in South America. However,
she needed help to counter British naval might. The Spanish tried to enlist French help to
this end in the mid-1820s. Seeing the possibility of untapped markets, British Foreign
Secretary George Canning earning cautious American support by informing Spain,
France and Russia that Britain generally supported Latin American liberalism and
independence. He also gained a promise from France with the Polignac Memorandum of
October 1823 not to assist Spain in recovering lost colonies in Latin America. Moreover,
Spain, France and the United States all lacked the naval might to defend or oppose any
doctrine of non-interference in the southwest Atlantic. The British navy thus became its
primary enforcer despite the Americans‟ unilateral announcement of the Doctrine. Hence,
the United States, Buenos Aires and Britain all benefited from the Monroe Doctrine and
the Polignac agreement. The United States won support for its disputes with Russia and a
role as a significant player in future hemispheric politics. Buenos Aires earned the
potential for protection and development of trade. Britain profited most by obtaining
French neutrality, inroads into favorable trading ports, and the isolation of Spain in her
Latin American exploits.6 The Royal Navy also gained the flexibility to actively protect
merchants and to survey more advantageous locations for naval bases. Canning‟s
diplomacy, supported by the might of the British fleet, elevated Britain to primacy in
South American politics and commerce, especially in Buenos Aires. 7

6

Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations to 1913 (Wilmington, DE:
SR Books, 2002), 108-110.

7

Barry M. Gough, “The British Reoccupation and Colonization of the Falkland Islands, or Malvinas, 18321843,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 22, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 263-264.

13

Despite denying the need to overtly intervene or annex territories as per the
Monroe Doctrine, the British government and the Royal Navy worked carefully to ensure
political stability and preference for British manufactures in Brazil and Argentina. In
August 1824 Canning wrote to Woodbine Parish, British envoy in Buenos Aires, that
Britain had no right or intention to actively work to separate Spain from its colonies. But
he also made it clear that the British wished to delicately secure more trade within the
region without angering the Spanish. 8 Therefore, in return for British naval efforts to
enforce the independence of Buenos Aires and Montevideo in the early 1820s, the British
received highly favorable trade treaties in those provinces and elsewhere. 9 Further
commenting on this turn of events Canning said, “Spanish America is free and if we do
not mismanage our affairs sadly, she is English.” 10 In short, British merchants and
administrators could not shun the chance to investigate markets in Brazil and Argentina
that could potentially relieve overproduction at home.
With the exception of a brief period of market saturation after 1815, the years
1810 to 1825 proved enticing to British free traders in Buenos Aires. In the 1820s a rapid
influx of British manufactures and lenders created much financial dependency on

Naval dominance allowed the British to eventually take the Falklands forcibly with little fear of substantial
military opposition.
8

Foreign Office, “Canning to Woodbine Parish, 23 August 1824,” in Webster, Britain and the
Independence of Latin America 1812-1830, 114 and 116.

9

Peter Winn, “British Informal Empire in Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century,” Past and Present, no. 73
(November 1976): 102.

10

H.W.V. Temperley, “The Later American Policy of George Canning,” American Historical Review 11
(1906), 796.

14

outsiders in the Rio de la Plata region. 11 In addition to Canning‟s diplomatic successes,
British influence increased owing to la feliz experiencia (the “happy experience”) in
Buenos Aires, a period in which Argentine merchants and elites enjoyed greater
prosperity and interest in European trade and culture. During this era Bernardino
Rivadavia, governor in Buenos Aires (and later first Argentine president), and finance
minister Manuel José García welcomed British trade and banking as well as Royal Naval
presence in the province. Rivadavia‟s government also secured a £1,000,000 loan from
Baring Brothers and Company, supposedly to develop harbors for shipping and to protect
ranching interests in las pampas, the grassy plains outside Buenos Aires. Most of the
loan instead helped create el Banco Nacional, dominated by British merchants.12 Britain
also gained further influence in Buenos Aires by formally recognizing the United
Provinces of the Rio de la Plata with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Navigation
and Commerce in early 1825. It pledged most-favored-nation status in trade, security of
property for residents and freedom of religion for both parties, but decidedly favored
British citizens. Its provisions allowed British merchants to overtake most mercantile
communities (mainly the textile industries) in Buenos Aires by the end of the decade.13
The panic in Montevideo in 1825 and the war between Brazil and Buenos Aires in
the late 1820s threatened British efforts to cash in on the economic potential of the South

11

Alan Knight, “Britain and Latin America,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume III: The
Nineteenth Century, ed. Andrew Porter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 125.

12

13

Rock, Argentina 1516-1982, 97. The loan was not fully repaid until 1904.

Henry S. Ferns, “Investment and Trade Between Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century,”
Economic History Review, New Series 3, no. 2 (1950): 203-205.

15

American interior.14 British merchants tried to withstand the turbulence and wait for a
chance to further extend their trade up the Rio de la Plata to the Paraná. They had
already overtaken Spanish and native trade, evaded forced loans payments, become
carriers for Portuguese and U.S. goods being brought to Buenos Aires, and saturated
Argentine markets with Lancashire muslins, calicos and hardware from the English
midlands. They also dominated the hide trade, created buying pools for hides and sold
loads of arms to revolutionary and other warring groups.15 Despite becoming profitable
areas for British traders however, coastal markets in Argentina and Brazil failed to reach
expectations. Though the value of British goods to Latin America reached £5 million by
the mid-1820s, Alan Knight points out that shortly thereafter “imported [British]
manufactures were piling up, unsold, in the warehouses of Buenos Aires, Lima, and Rio
[de Janiero].”16 Unrest and market saturation caused many British traders to leave.
Those who remained began to clamor for intervention. They called on British diplomats
and the navy to stabilize the region and protect commerce in Buenos Aires, Rio de
Janiero, Montevideo and the interior.17 Policy-makers responded to these concerns by
approving mostly small “defensive-minded” naval raids in areas where British trade
faced threats. Wishing to avoid the image of heavy-handedness, the Foreign Office did
not rule out the occasional use of force to assert commercial and political sway. Such

14

Winn, “British Informal Empire in Uruguay,” 102. The war severely curtailed trade along the Paraná.

15

Rock, Argentina 1516-1982, 95-96 and 100.

16

Knight, “Britain and Latin America,” 127.

17

Gough, “The British Reoccupation,” 265.

16

actions became rather common by the time Lord Palmerston first took over at the Foreign
Office in 1830.18 Meanwhile, the French continued to compete with the British for
markets in Buenos Aires and Montevideo over the next two decades.
In the late 1820s Argentine investors, driven out of other sectors by foreign
traders, turned toward the development of cattle ranching near Buenos Aires. British
interest in cattle investment followed. 19 This economic shift allowed the federalist
caudillo Juan Manuel de Rosas to rise to power in Buenos Aires and further entwined
British traders with Argentine finances. In 1815 Rosas and two partners invested in a
saladero (a house for curing beef) just south of Buenos Aires that became highly
productive. Within a decade, he virtually controlled cattle ranching in and around the
city. In the late 1820s, he translated his economic success into tyrannical local political
control, making him a thorny but necessary ally for the British. 20 Rosas would also have
liked to reduce British clout in Buenos Aires. But dependence on British protection
against French incursions, British investment in the province‟s sheep and cattle estancias
(including Rosas‟s own lands) and the inability to pay back the Baring Brothers‟ loan
placed Rosas in a precarious financial position. Argentina‟s financial situation became so
desperate that by 1838 he offered to drop claims to the Falklands in return for the

18

Martin Lynn, “British Policy, Trade, and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” in The
Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Andrew Porter (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998-1999), 106-107.

19

20

Rock, Argentina 1516-1982, 96, 100.

Rock, Argentina 1516-1982, 104; and James R. Scobie, Argentina: A City and a Nation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964), 77-81. Conservative elements enjoyed Rosas‟s authoritarian protection of
ranching interests and many of the poorer classes considered him a popular hero. Rosas went on to be the
de facto dictator of Argentina from 1829 until 1852. He was overthrown by the Brazilian- and Uruguayanbacked leader Justo José de Urquiza, and ironically spent the rest of his life in exile in Southampton.

17

cancellation of the Baring Brothers debt. Britain rejected the offer, as the loan had been
in default since 1828. Such financial dependency helps clarify Rosas‟s continued loud,
but fruitless criticism of the British takeover of the Falklands, and encouraged British
indifference toward Argentine protests after formal colonization began in 1843. 21
The rapidity of British commercial influx into Argentina and Brazil caused
British oversight of commercial and diplomatic activities in the southwest Atlantic to take
on a rather haphazard character until well into the 1830s. No single agency held
exclusive control over dealings in these far-off locales.22 The empire and foreign affairs
were no longer handled completely separately. The entry of free trade and liberalism into
South America and in the formal empire forced policy-makers to merge their efforts. A
hybrid empire appeared in which formal and informal imperial policy-making had
interlocked to aid continuous British expansionism.23 Before 1827, most in government
wanted such “imperial” matters, formal and informal, handled as discreetly as possible in
order to avoid the embarrassment and confusion brought about by public debate over
expansionism. Helen Taft Manning argues that until the early 1830s most
parliamentarians left the handling of these affairs to administrative bodies reporting to,
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but not regularly troubling parliament.24 Furthermore, such reluctance induced local
officials in distant spheres like the southwest Atlantic to make many ground-level
decisions with few formal orders from home. Consequently, their actions often diverged
from British policy. Not until after 1830 did governments attempt to compose dispatches
for governors and diplomats to serve as a guide for them during their appointments. 25
Initial parliamentary reluctance to participate in policy-making in British political and
commercial expansion in the southwest Atlantic prompted several cabinet departments to
take on shared administrative and diplomatic duties. This overlap in management
inhibited the protection of diplomacy and commercial activities in South America and
reduced the efficiency of later British administration of the Falklands.
The Foreign Office and the Colonial Office (a division within the War Office
until 1854) generally made policy for South America, but shared some decision-making
power with the Board of Trade, a mainly advisory committee on domestic and foreign
commerce. Ultimately, all three answered to the Treasury and the prime minister. 26 The
Foreign Office traditionally handled most diplomatic issues, but the growth of free trade
caused a blending of foreign and colonial policy-making. Leadership and authority in
directing foreign or colonial affairs in peripheral areas like the southwest Atlantic
suffered from confusion and contradictions in messages sent to merchants and officials.
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Additionally, during the later 1820s and early 1830s the capitalist public grew more
interested in colonial government and trade regulation overseas, further crowding the
decision-making process.27 Parliamentarians responded to these pressures by engaging
more often in debates that criticized cabinet-directed colonial and commercial
strategies.28 To appease the growing mercantile electorate enfranchised by the Reform
Bill of 1832, governments showed increasing faith in free trade to guide policy, as free
trade seemed quieter politically and less burdensome to taxpayers.
Under the second Earl Grey‟s ministry, the Foreign Office-Colonial Office-Board
of Trade “triumvirate” generally came to believe the thinking of physiocrats and free
traders that free trade could open markets in South America for industrial merchants,
mainly by kindling favorable trade treaties and promoting economic and political
liberalism. 29 Despite their growing faith in free trade, however, British leaders “were not
opposed to acquiring small strategically or economically important islands and bases like
the Falklands off the coast of Argentina” in order to ensure a ready naval presence. 30 But
even in the 1840s naval intervention was almost never a first option for protecting trade.
As domestic economic distress arose, many went about seeking ways to efficiently
institute free trade in areas of British interest with the least amount of military costs.
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Additionally, the consular service (under Foreign Office direction) took on the
yeomanly duties of managing and protecting free trade in the southwest Atlantic. The
consul service in South America lacked the glamor and political prospects of the British
diplomatic service in established states. But consuls such as Woodbine Parish proved
invaluable. They promoted free trade treaties and oversaw the Merchant Shipping Acts,
protecting merchant seamen and giving advice to help them profit. Consuls often reported
that shipping duties absorbed nearly all of their time at busy ports and left them little time
to function as actual diplomats.31 According to D. C. M. Platt, the foremost characteristic
of consuls appointed in distant lands was their willingness and diligence in working to
protect free trade. He states, “the frequent revolutions of Latin American Republics, for
example, made the political functions of mediation, the presentation of claims, and the
granting of asylum, a most important part of normal consular activity.” 32 Therefore,
despite their low rank in the Foreign Office, the attentiveness of British consuls in South
America greatly assisted in promoting trade and protection for British interests.
The Board of Trade also affected British dealings in the southwest Atlantic and in
the formal empire. One can credit William Huskisson, President of the Board of Trade
between 1823 and 1827 and Secretary of State for War and Colonies in 1827-1828, with
the first major successes in promoting liberalism and efficiency within the empire and in
trade relations with South America‟s new nations. He rejected what he considered to be
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D. C. M. Platt, “The Role of the British Consular Service in Overseas Trade 1825-1914,” Economic
History Review, New Series 15, no. 3 (1963): 494-495. Platt refers to these officials as “trading consuls,”
as most of their activities revolved around keeping the door open for British traders in distant ports.
32

Platt, “The Role of the British Consular Service in Overseas Trade 1825-1914,” 495.

21

an antiquated “paternalistic” view of trade in formal colonies and in spheres of influence
that required extensive governmental and military management. During the mid-1820s,
he influenced other administrators, including Robert Peel and George Grant (later created
Baron Glenelg in 1835), to use free trade capitalism to help streamline commerce and
administration within the empire. According to Paul Knaplund, “Huskisson, while
tidying trade and navigation laws, made significant changes in Britain‟s commercial
system; and as colonial secretary, 1827-1828, he infused a new spirit into the
administration of colonies—a spirit of reasonableness and efficiency.” 33 This did not
mean Huskisson and his successor as colonial secretary, Sir George Murray, believed in
abandoning colonies. Rather, they believed that free trade would decrease foreign
political entanglements and heavy tax burdens that financed formal possessions, while
still providing high returns on investments in distant markets. But Huskisson did not
operate in a vacuum. He served simultaneously as the Treasurer of the Navy during his
Board of Trade presidency and likely realized the need for at least some governmental
and military oversight in British colonial and trade. In a May 1828 speech on the civil
government of Canada, he said, “England cannot afford to be too little.”34 While his
speech dealt with a much larger colony than island bases such as the Falklands, this
principle was consistent with general notions inside the Board of Trade. Along with
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Huskisson at the Board of Trade, two Vice Presidents of the Board, Thomas Wallace
(1818-1823) and George Grant (1823-1827) pushed laws and reforms for commerce in
both North and South America that tried to phase out coercive mercantilist practices and
promote preference for British trade.35 Huskisson built upon Wallace‟s 1822 reforms
allowing free trade between British colonies and American states for certain food
products and raw materials. He allowed nearly total free trade in the colonies for noncolonials in return for partiality toward colonial traders in foreign markets. He also
ridded colonial ports of large levies on foreign goods, while extending the warehouse
system to the colonies and lowering domestic duties on colonial imports. 36 Huskissonites
and other free traders claimed two overall advantages over the old mercantile system.
First, free trade would stimulate British manufacturing at home and inject sterling into
other countries by way of procuring raw materials and foods. Then those countries
would buy back the manufactured products, advancing Britain‟s status as the “Workshop
of the World.” Second, free trade could act as a moral force. Many free traders touted
the “civilizing” effect of free trade in South America. They claimed it encouraged hard
work, economic liberalism, “Britishness” and Christian morality. 37 Huskisson most
heavily influenced British colonial and trade policy through his defense of British
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imperial activity on political rather than strictly economic bases. As W. P. Morrell states,
to free traders, “the greatest merit of England was to have planted the seeds of freedom,
civilization, and Christianity in every quarter of the globe—to have promoted the growth
of new nations kindred in blood, habits, and in feelings to herself….” 38 Husskisson tried
to create a more humane imperialism in order to save the “second British Empire from
going the way of the first.”39 Some officials of the late 1820s also considered that
existing and possibly newer and cheaper naval bases in the region could both protect
travel around Cape Horn and by default spread British culture to regions in need of
“civilization.”40 The Board of Trade‟s commercial policy pushed British humanitarian
ideals within the framework of free trade capitalism in both formal colonies and distant
spheres of influence.41 Free trade, however, called for efficiency above all else,
especially in military expenditures. Many critics saw Britain‟s large “peacetime” navy as
a contradiction to the cost-effectiveness required by free trade. Many parliamentarians in
the late 1820s reasoned that reducing colonial and naval costs in South America and
elsewhere would ease taxes on the middling and lower orders. Furthermore, utilitarians
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill argued against holding formal colonies altogether.
Their ideas influenced colonial and foreign secretaries to seek cuts in naval
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expenditures.42 Both men claimed that formal empire encouraged uneven flow of capital
from Britain to her colonies. Should mercantilist policies be erased, capital could flow
more freely to eager markets, boosting profits both at home and abroad. What is more,
neither believed that the empire could relieve distress caused by surplus population. 43
Desires to loosen economic grips on British formal colonies coincided with the
reluctance of successive governments to become embroiled in suppressing revolutions in
both Europe and Latin America from 1815 to 1830. George Canning‟s calls for a
“Concert of Europe” rather than permanent alliances appeared useless to Continental
conservatives, as it failed to quell revolutions and unrest in many areas. Between 1820
and 1831, Greece, France, Belgium, Poland, Germany, and the Papal States experienced
revolutions that British leaders condemned. At the same time they refused to help
suppress them in any great degree.44 Castlereagh and Canning saw South America as a
new ground for experimentation in the use of persuasion over coercion in order to gain
new markets. As Cain and Hopkins maintain, “commercial expansion abroad would
deliver prosperity, and prosperity would fix in place a string of friendly states which
would help to maintain stability in a world caught between the old „worn out‟ monarchies
of continental Europe and the „youthful and stirring‟ nations headed by the United

42

Knaplund, The British Empire 1815-1939, 32.

43

Eileen P. Sullivan, “Liberalism and Imperialism: J. S. Mill‟s Defense of the British Empire,” Journal of
the History of Ideas 44, no. 4 (October-December 1983): 601.

44

Martin Pugh, Britain Since 1789: A Concise History (New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1999), 84-85. The
British hoped to maintain a “Concert of Europe” in which the five major empires could check French
aggression in the west and Russian aggression in the east through periodic meetings of the Great Powers.

25

States.”45 Canning‟s refusal to openly aid Spain in its American re-conquest led
Metternich to regard him as a revolutionary sympathizer. But Canning and his cabinet
were pragmatists, not revolutionaries. They adopted Huskisson‟s and Bentham‟s ideas
that large entanglements lacked utility because they detracted from domestic economic
reforms and interrupted trade abroad.46 But they also endorsed rare uses of naval force in
order to check United States, Spanish and French expansionism in South America.47
This realization caused dilemmas for the South American station at Rio de
Janiero. Steady reductions in naval expenditures along with increased naval
responsibilities created naval overextension in the southwest Atlantic. 48 Thus, protection
and assistance of trade in the southwest Atlantic relied heavily on the threat of naval
actions against competitors and local strongmen. Despite the use of primarily small,
surgical naval actions, detractors pointed out the lack of large naval engagements and
bemoaned the navy‟s inefficient and costly “peacetime” upkeep. In the late 1820s,
Joseph Hume rose to lead a small but indefatigable cabal of radical MPs who, usually
armed with a tedious arsenal of facts, demanded cutbacks in naval expenses in areas of
both formal and informal empire. They reproached the Admiralty for perceived
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wastefulness during nearly every discussion of naval estimates for the next two and a half
decades. 49
Despite the growing demand for naval reductions, British consuls like Woodbine
Parish in Buenos Aires encouraged the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office to make
assisting commerce one of the Royal Navy‟s main duties in the southwest Atlantic. 50
Most naval stations in the region sat on the mainland however, surrounded by local
political turbulence and American, French and Spanish intrigues. The Monroe Doctrine,
enforced largely by Britain, also limited overt British naval interventions. For example,
the war between Brazil and Argentina in 1825 over La Banda Oriental dealt a disastrous
blow to British, American and French trading in Montevideo and Buenos Aires. 51
Although British merchants demanded naval intervention to end the resulting blockades,
the British envoy Lord Ponsonby (predecessor to Parish in Buenos Aires) approved only
the use of diplomatic pressure. Mediated by the British government, his plan created
Uruguay as a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil. It also reinforced Montevideo
as a friendly port for British free traders. Ostensibly, Montevideo would aid the potential
expansion of British trade up the Rio de la Plata and the Paraná into the Brazilian and
Argentine interiors, and at the same time squeeze out competing commercial interests.52

49

Peter Borroughs, “Parliamentary Radicals and the Reduction of Imperial Expenditure in British North
America, 1827-1834,” Historical Journal 11, no. 3 (1968): 446-447.
50

Gough, “The British Reoccupation” 264-265.

51

Winn, “British Informal Empire in Uruguay,” 102-103. La Banda Oriental is present-day Uruguay.

52

Winn, “British Informal Empire in Uruguay,” 102-103. Argentina and Brazil were the “two pillars” of
Canning‟s South American policy and British trade dominance there was paramount to him.

27

The British Takeover of the Falkland Islands and the Sovereignty Dispute
British merchants, the Royal Navy and British diplomats could count on no real
economic or political stability in South America at the end of the 1820s. Bernardo
Rivadavia‟s government in Buenos Aires, which had promoted strong ties to British
finances and culture, gave way to the pricklier dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1829.
Rosas‟s more populist federalist stance, oppressive caudillo tactics and propensity for
civil wars provoked more concerns by the dwindling number of British merchants willing
to remain in Buenos Aires. British connection with the province slipped as a trade
depression developed between the two. Not until 1837 did British trade regain the value
it boasted in 1825, and even then it dominated less of the market than before. 53
The Royal Navy and many in government reacted by more seriously considering
the use of easily defended nearby islands that could serve a variety of other purposes for
both military and civilian needs. Geographically, the Falkland Islands seemed the most
sensible choice. The Falklands were (and still are) comprised mainly of two large
landmasses: East Falkland and the less habitable West Falkland, and are surrounded by a
multitude of other small and barren islands. Despite dismal reports from some surveyors
or naturalists who visited the islands and the reservations of some government officials
toward annexation of distant lands, many navy men, diplomats and merchants advocated
the potential these islands held for benefiting British interests. At a reasonably low cost,
the navy could easily utilize the Falkland Islands for the military and political strategy of
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protecting free trade on the coastlines of South America. And unlike New Zealand and
Australia, they were nearly devoid of indigenous inhabitants. In 1829, a variety of
strategic concerns drew the British government into a territorial debate with Juan Manuel
de Rosas over the islands. Though the overall purpose of this study is not to extensively
examine the Falkland Islands‟ sovereignty issue, a brief discussion of disputes over their
rightful possession helps explain the British impulse to seize them in January 1833.
From as early as the sixteenth century many groups declared sovereignty over the
islands, including the French, Spanish, British and Argentines, with the dispute between
the latter two spawning the most potent debate. Argentine literature focuses much on the
Argentine “right of inheritance” to pieces of the crumbling Spanish Empire that sat near
them.54 Defenders of British claims emphasize the right of “prior discovery” and point to
Britain‟s purchase of the islands from the Spanish in 1771 as legitimization of
ownership. 55 Early on, the French and Spanish Bourbons claimed the Falklands, which
they called “les Isles Malouines” or “las Islas Malvinas.”56 In 1764, the French
circumnavigator Louis Antoine de Bougainville established Port Louis on East Falkland
54
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through private means in the hopes of gathering new lands for a recently defeated France
and gaining the favor of King Louis XV. He presented it as a potential key to the Pacific
and as a way to check British interests. The king authorized the settlement, but Spanish
agents in Montevideo protested. Unbeknownst to Bougainville, at the Spanish Bourbons‟
request, France handed over the islands to Spain in 1766. France wished to maintain
friendly relations with Spain in order to check British actions in the Southwest Atlantic. 57
A year earlier, either in secrecy or unaware of French and Spanish claims, John Byron of
HMS Dolphin established a small settlement of his own at Port Egmont (West Falkland)
and officially announced British claim to it in January 1766. 58 In 1767 Spain formally
compensated Bougainville with 600,000 Libras, renaming his settlement “Port Soledad”
and listing both East and West Falkland under the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires. 59 Ports
Egmont and Soledad (Louis) coexisted rather quietly until 1769, when two heated
meetings between British and Spanish naval vessels near Port Soledad ended in the
Spanish presenting papers as proof of their purchase of the islands from France. After an
exchange of angry protests between the British government and Spanish agents working
from Montevideo, both refused to withdraw their settlements. In 1770 intensified threats
by both parties impelled the Viceroy of Montevideo to send at least four warships to
drive the British settlers out of Port Egmont. This expulsion led Britain and Spain to the

57

Marcos de Estrada, Una verdad sobre las Malvinas (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Culturales Argentinas,
1982), 15-16. The Spanish would later call Port Louis, located on Berkeley Sound, “Port Soledad.” Also,
Bougainville‟s contingent only numbered around 150.
58

59

Calvert, “Sovereignty and the Falkland Islands,” 406.

Estrada, Una verdad sobre las Malvinas, 15-17; and Calvert, “Sovereignty and the Falkland Islands,”
406. “Port Soledad” and “Port Louis” are used interchangeably by many sources.

30

brink of war. When the French refused to lend their support, Spain allowed the British to
return to Port Egmont, but continued to claim sovereignty. 60 Ironically, the British left
Port Egmont in 1774 owing to bad weather and lack of profit. They left only a plaque
and a flag to protect their claim. Meanwhile, the Spanish continued to list the Falklands
under the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, but likewise deserted their settlement in 1811. 61
Britain and Spain continued to claim the islands after the end of the Napoleonic
Wars, but neither carried out any serious further acts of sovereignty. 62 After Napoleon‟s
invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1807-1808, the ensuing guerrilla war between
Bourbon loyalists and Napoleon‟s forces weakened Spain‟s control over South America.
Over the next two decades, many loyalists in South America resisted the independence
movements of both Simon Bolívar in the north and José de San Martín in the southern
interior and the west, leading to immense turmoil. In 1820 the United Provinces boldly
declared ownership of certain “inherited” territories from Spain, including the Falklands
and several other possessions, some of which Spain never formally owned. But since
neither France nor Britain had recognized the United Provinces they likely considered the
claim untenable and gave it little attention. Moreover, Britain and France showed scant
concern, as the Argentines posed little real threat on the seas. 63 This indifference
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convinced Buenos Aires to act on their pronouncement. In August 1821, The Times
reported that an American national, Daniel Jewett, aboard the frigate Heroina, acting as a
Colonel of the Marine for the United Provinces, had captured the islands. According to
this report, neither American nor British witnesses opposed the act.64 Jewett then sent out
notes to the United States and Britain prohibiting fishing, hunting and sealing on and
around the islands without permission from Buenos Aires. He received no reply.
Therefore, Buenos Aires appointed a governor of the islands in 1823 to dole out land,
grazing and fishing rights. Again, no nations lodged any official protest.65 In 1826,
scarcely a year after its formal recognition by Britain, Buenos Aires chartered
businessman Luis Vernet to establish a settlement at Port Soledad (Port Louis.) They
officially named him governor in 1828 and ceded most rights of ownership to him for
three years. They hoped he would create a permanent fishing, hunting and whaling
station, a penal settlement and, after the Argentine-Brazilian conflicts of 1825-1828, a
refuge for anti-Brazilian privateers.66 The British, French and Americans paid little heed
to these developments until June 1829, when Juan Manuel de Rosas issued a decree of
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ownership over the Falklands, claiming that war with Brazil in La Banda Oriental had
distracted Buenos Aires from colonizing the islands. It also stated that all territories
under the former Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires had passed to the new government of
Buenos Aires. This announcement, however, directly conflicted with British interests.
Woodbine Parish and regional merchants were concerned, given Rosas‟s caudillo
tendencies. In July 1829 Parish forwarded a letter from a Mr. Beckington to Foreign
Secretary Lord Aberdeen that called for a British station in the Falklands to act as a
whaling center and a naval base to stop privateering in the region. A year and a half later
a letter from Lt. William Langdon, R. N., to whom Luis Vernet had granted a sizable land
parcel, fully backed Beckington‟s pleas. 67 Parish urgently asked Aberdeen for
instructions, adding that Vernet would not oppose British naval protection for Port
Louis.68 After hearing of Rosas‟s intentions, Colonial Secretary Sir George Murray
advised the Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington to consider taking action:
It appears to me that the interval between the cessation of the power of old
Spain and the consolidation of that of the new governments in South
America would be the best time for our resuming our former possession of
the Falkland Islands…. I have not spoken with Lord Melville on the
subject, but I believe he is very sensible of the importance in the naval
point of view of the occupation of those islands. 69
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The duke, anxious not to incite French or American anger, but unwilling to allow Rosas
such a presumptuous claim, replied to Murray on 25 July 1829:
It is not clear to me that we have ever possessed the sovereignty of all
these islands. The convention certainly goes no farther than to restore to
us Port [Egmont], which we abandoned nearly sixty years ago. If our right
to the Falkland Islands had been undisputed at that time and indisputable, I
confess that I should doubt the expediency of now taking possession of
them. We have possession of nearly every valuable post and colony in the
world and I confess that I am anxious to avoid to excite the attention and
jealousy of other powers by extending our possessions and setting the
example of the gratification of a desire to seize upon new territories. But
in this case in which our right to possess more than Port [Egmont] is
disputed, and at least doubtful, it is very desireable [sic] to avoid such acts.
I am at the same time very sensible of the inconvenience which may be
felt by this country and of the injury which will be done to us if either the
French or Americans should settle upon these islands, the former in virtue
of any claim from former occupancy, the latter or both from any claim
derived by purchase or cession from the government of Buenos Ayres.
That which I would recommend is that the government of Buenos [Ayres]
should be very quietly but very distinctly informed that His Majesty has
claims upon Falklands Islands and that His Majesty will not allow of any
settlement upon, or any cession to, individuals or foreign nations of these
islands by Buenos Ayres, which shall be inconsistent with the King's
acknowledged right of sovereignty. I think that this is all that can be done
at present. It will have the effect of impeding any settlement or cession by
Buenos Ayres and as we may suppose that the French and Americans will
hear of this communication they will not be disposed to act in
contravention to it unless determined upon a quarrel with this country. 70
Ironically, Wellington never mentions the Monroe Doctrine, nor denies the potential of
the islands, but shows preference for discreet influence over formal annexation. He
stresses doubt about Britain‟s claim to the islands, but admits the danger of letting them
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fall into competitors‟ hands. Despite Wellington‟s reluctance, on the advice of
Beckington, Parish and the navy, in early August 1829, Aberdeen instructed Parish to
formally demand that Buenos Aires rescind its claim. His dispatch noted:
…the acts of [the government of Buenos Aires] had been done without
reference to the validity of the claims which His Majesty had constantly
asserted to the sovereignty of the [Falkland] islands; and that it was
therefore essential that the proceedings of the Republican Government
should not be permitted to injure the rights of His Majesty, which were
founded upon the original discovery and subsequent occupation of the
islands….71
Despite Argentine ministers‟ promises to consider his protest, Parish never received a
reply. Britain later used this snub to prove Argentine disinterest in protecting the islands.
Meanwhile, Luis Vernet‟s arrests of several American boat crews in mid-1831
caused a diplomatic diversion between the United States and Buenos Aires that allowed
Britain to exploit the chance to reoccupy the Falklands. Despite Vernet‟s modest
successes in colonizing Port Soledad (Port Louis) for the Argentines, he received little
more than diplomatic protection from Buenos Aires. Independently acting to protect his
own interests in July 1831, Vernet seized the American sealers Harriet, Breakwater and
Superior for violating Rosas‟s 1829 decree prohibiting illegal use of the Falklands‟
shores. While the Breakwater and the Superior managed to escape, Vernet took the
Harriet’s crew to Buenos Aires to stand trial. After the Breakwater reported the affair,
the abrasive American consul George Slacum in Buenos Aires (and later the equally
unpopular Frances Baylies) engaged in a fiery exchange with Argentine minister Manuel
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Vicente Maza. The Americans argued that for centuries, ships of all nations regularly
visited the Falklands for shelter, hunting wild cattle, fishing and sealing. Fearing
American reprisal, Vernet stepped up appeals to Parish for British support and naval
protection. He presented the advantages of East Falkland as a refitting station as well as
a better port for rounding the Horn than Rio de Janiero or Buenos Aires, and even as a
place for gathering anti-scorbutic vegetables. Parish‟s report did not reach Britain in time
to protect Vernet.72 The U.S.S. Lexington, with the approval of President Andrew
Jackson, captured Vernet in December 1831 and destroyed Port Louis. 73 Vernet‟s
settlement had claimed a population of 90, but American retribution ruined it. The
renewal of angry diplomacy between the United States and Buenos Aires and the
temporary retirement of Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1832 opened a back door through
which Britain chose to re-establish control over Port Egmont and expand her claims over
the islands. Furthermore, as civil war had devastated Buenos Aires, the new government
in Buenos Aires could have done little to halt British actions.74 In late 1832, the
Admiralty sent H.M.S. Clio, on the advice of the Foreign and Colonial Offices, to
conduct an “act of sovereignty” in the Falkland Islands. Thereafter, the Admiralty was to
send a ship to the islands annually to make a formal show of British ownership. The
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Americans did not dispute this action, so long as American fishing rights were no longer
impeded. 75 On 2 January 1833, Captain J. J. Onslow of the Clio, along with the H.M.S.
Tyne forced out the Argentine schooner Sarandí and the next day formally took
possession of the islands.76 As retribution for his ties to Buenos Aires, the Colonial and
Foreign Offices denied Luis Vernet‟s return. Hence, Vernet lost all financial and
political claims granted by Buenos Aires in the islands, never to regain them. 77
For the next year, the Argentine representative in London, Manuel Moreno,
pointed to illegal British use of “Right of the Strongest” to “humiliate and depress a
powerless and infant people,” and Buenos Aires‟s rights of territorial inheritance. 78
Moreno‟s protests met with indifference, if not plain scorn. In December 1841 Moreno
sent another series of angry notes to the Foreign Office after Henry Mandeville, British
consul in Buenos Aires, announced that Britain would send a permanent governor to the
Falklands to formally colonize both East and West Falkland. Moreno claimed that the
Argentine Confederation deserved compensation for at least East Falkland, where Port
Louis once sat. His protests again fell on deaf ears. Colonial Secretary Lord Stanley and
Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen agreed that to legitimize any future plans to colonize
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the islands, Britain must remain outwardly firm in her claims. 79 Moreno renewed his
assertions to Foreign Secretary Viscount Palmerston in 1849. After reading statements
supposedly made in parliament by Palmerston that Argentina had, by lack of interest,
given up her claims to the Falklands, Moreno sent him a seething letter in July 1849.
Palmerston told Moreno that the newspapers had misquoted him and that he had duly
noted Argentina‟s protests.80 But Palmerston, like Stanley and Aberdeen before him,
largely ignored what they considered Moreno‟s tiresome legalistic bravado. As early as
July 1837, Palmerston acknowledged with a side note on a letter from Colonial Office to
the Foreign Office that, just as in 1834, “it may be best to let the [sovereignty] matter
drop.”81 In fact, Foreign and Colonial Office foot-dragging became the general way to
parry Moreno‟s demands. Because of British naval power and Argentine dependence on
British investment, the home government considered Argentine aggression unlikely, and
preferred to discount Moreno‟s and Rosas‟s periodic complaints. 82
British officials needed utilitarian justifications to hold the islands given their
dismissal of Argentine protests. Despite much optimism in reports by naval men,
administrators and surveyors who touted the Falklands‟ potential, the government largely
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treated the settlement with gross negligence throughout its first decade. British
development of Falklands reflected the growth of and polarization of public discourse in
Britain about the empire throughout the 1830s. From the early 1840s until the chartering
of the Falkland Islands Company in 1851 the government showed more willingness to act
towards fully developing a colony there, but economic distress and strong opposition in
government led to an inconsistent and reluctant colonizing process.
Foreign and Colonial Policy-Making 1833-1851: Palmerston, Wakefield, and Stephen
The 1830s and 1840s proved an era in which domestic and Continental politics
occupied much of the British government‟s time, leaving little time for addressing distant
colonial affairs. Between 1830 and 1852, heated political rivalry abounded between
Whigs (later Liberals), Conservatives and radical reformers, leading to much government
turnover. Five prime ministers oversaw seven different administrations between 1828
and 1852, and a new monarch, Queen Victoria, took the throne in 1837.83 However, the
Foreign and Colonial Offices enjoyed much more stability owing to the policies of
several key officials and civil servants. Viscount Palmerston occupied the Foreign Office
for all but six years between 1830 and 1851. 84 Likewise, the civil servant and lawyer
James Stephen served in several capacities in colonial administration from 1825 until his
official retirement in 1847, earning most renown as permanent undersecretary for the
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colonies from 1836 to 1847. His tireless attention to detail and knowledge of law enabled
him to maintain relative continuity in policy, despite serving several different Secretaries
of State for War and the Colonies. 85 Stephen‟s influence declined after the third Earl
Grey‟s appointment as colonial secretary in 1846, but he still held great sway in policymaking into the late 1840s. Russell and Grey also tried to reduce Palmerston‟s influence
in colonial policy-making, but he still enjoyed much public popularity, which he used to
his political advantage. Also during the 1830s and 1840s, the controversial theorist
Edward Gibbon Wakefield worked through advocates in government to change official
views and methods of colonization.
As prime minister 1830-1834, the second Earl Grey purposefully chose
experienced or charismatic men like Lord Goderich, Lord John Russell, E. G. Stanley
(later Lord Stanley), Lord Auckland, Viscount Palmerston and Sir James Graham (First
Lord of the Admiralty) to man his cabinet. The first half of this ministry was
preoccupied with the passage of the Reform Act of 1832. Consequently, strategic issues
in the distant southwest Atlantic earned little attention outside the Admiralty and Foreign
Office. Though the cabinet generally agreed with Graham that Britain should keep a
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strong navy to protect maritime trade, they, like parliament, balked at the costs. Thus, the
first half of the 1830s proved an era of naval contraction. During the transition between
Prime Ministers Wellington and Grey however, the Admiralty and the Foreign Office
held on to the possibility of the navy utilizing the Falklands in order to discourage French
and American ambitions in the southwest Atlantic. 86 Palmerston, as the new foreign
secretary, embraced liberalism in trade, avoidance of long-term foreign entanglements,
diplomatic caution toward Britain‟s Continental competitors (particularly France) and the
use of public opinion to gain political capital. 87 As Pugh asserts, “Palmerston used
imperial and foreign issues to strengthen his domestic position, outmaneuvering his
opponents and exploiting popular patriotism by his bold defence of British interests.” 88 It
therefore stands to reason that he never ruled out the use of pointed naval force where
British interests were threatened. Consequently, he did not oppose the takeover of the
Falklands. In 1832 he approved the Admiralty‟s dispatching a Royal Navy vessel to
demonstrate British sovereignty. And over the three decades following the British
takeover, he regularly dismissed Argentine demands to recoup the islands. 89
From outside parliament, the colonizer Edward Gibbon Wakefield grew highly
influential among “colonial reformers” from the early 1830s to the early 1850s. Before
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1830, parliament troubled itself little with colonial affairs, generally deferring them to
cabinet departments for succinct and inconspicuous resolution. However, after the
Reform Act of 1832 enfranchised a number of wealthy maritime traders, parliamentary
discussions of southwest Atlantic trade increased. Wakefield‟s schemes appealed to
these merchants, who saw potential for revenue in colonial development. He advocated
an ambitious idea known as systematic colonization, which, in theory, could be applied to
even the smallest British colonial possessions in order to make them profitable to the
public. His ideas gained notoriety with the publication of his Letter From Sydney in
1829. It illustrated what Wakefield considered haphazard land sales in Australia, making
colonial production inefficient and dependent on convict labor. He proposed that
chartered companies offer a fixed price for crown waste lands and use the profits to
finance the immigration of younger, married couples to those colonies. He opposed
transporting paupers, as he preferred reputable settlers who could contribute to prosperity
and eventually self-government in distant colonies. Presumably, this policy could also
help alleviate Malthusian and Benthamite warnings about Britain‟s surplus population. 90
Wakefield advocated selling land parcels at a “sufficient” price so as to discourage
buying frenzies by speculators and laborers who had no intention of improving colonial
lands. Reputable immigrants would also spread British culture to colonies and establish
friendlier relations between Britain and her territories.91 His plan would earn tidy sums
for sensible investors and reduce domestic taxation to maintain the empire. Further, once
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begun, land sales would fund transportation for incoming settlers. Skeptics at the Foreign
and Colonial Offices blocked much of Wakefield‟s early efforts, however. His backers
regularly cried foul at the Colonial Office which they considered out of step with new
capitalistic trends, and at times even accused the Colonial Office of keeping colonial
lands for its own gain. 92 Wakefield promoted fewer taxes to fund the empire and relaxed
government control over colonization while spreading “Britishness” globally. His
supporters also argued that colonial development and administration would become more
“efficient,” and that investors could earn profits while civilizing distant lands.
Systematic colonization acted as a chief polarizing force concerning colonial
administration at home and in the colonies. Many in the Colonial Office saw Wakefield
as a rascal and colonial profiteer. In his later works, England and America (1833) and A
View of the Art of Colonization (1849) Wakefield more meticulously developed his
schemes, but still met with great opposition from government skeptics. Moreover, after
having been imprisoned from 1827 to 1830 for an infamous kidnapping attempt, many
regarded him as a common criminal bent on making his fortune at government expense.
Additionally, James Stephen and other humanitarian reformers feared that his ideas might
lead to exploitation of natives in Australia and in New Zealand. With a tainted reputation
that made him unlikely to earn a seat in the Commons, Wakefield worked vicariously
through prominent radicals in parliament like William Molesworth and Charles Buller.
He also gained support from the impressionable Viscount Howick (later the third Earl
Grey), who became parliamentary under-secretary of the Colonial Office in 1830.
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Howick began to endorse Wakefieldian-style land sales in Australia in the early 1830s,
and even convinced the doubtful Colonial Secretary Lord Goderich to explore
Wakefield‟s ideas. 93 Though the support of Molesworth, Buller and Howick gave
systematic colonization more legitimacy, the Colonial Office blocked his proposal to
implement systematic land distribution in South Australia in 1832. Parliament then
approved a South Australia Company in 1833, and passed an act in 1834 providing for
the official colonization of South Australia as well as a special commission to distribute
land. In 1836, the Commons called Wakefield to testify about the problems and possible
solutions for disposal of “waste lands” in the colonies. A year later, with much
opposition from the Colonial Office, he spearheaded the creation of the New Zealand
Company to try to implement his plans. After several visits to Canada in the 1830s,
Wakefield gained influence with Lord Durham, then High Commissioner for British
North America, who proposed that Wakefield become his Commissioner of Crown
Lands. The Colonial Office rejected this appointment, and Wakefield again acted as an
unofficial adviser for Canada‟s land disposal. The Durham Report of 1838, issued in
response to the rebellion of 1837 in Canada, was heavily influenced by Buller and
Wakefield and recommended a move toward responsible government in “self-sufficient”
colonies.94 Between 1839 and 1843, Wakefield won over several Canadian colonial
administrators, some of them initially resistant, most notably Governor-General Lord
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Sydenham. After some heated debate between the new Governor-General Sir Charles
Bagot and Wakefield during his final visit to Canada in 1843, Wakefield lost favor with
the Canadian colonial administration. This, along with his brother‟s death in the same
year, prompted him to return to England. Between 1844 and 1846, both colonial
secretaries, Lord Stanley and William Gladstone, refused Wakefield‟s plans in New
Zealand. When the sympathetic third Earl Grey became colonial office secretary in mid1846 he cooled toward Wakefield‟s proposition that the New Zealand Company, of
which Grey was a member, take over the entirety of crown land sales and colonization of
New Zealand. And despite the strong backing shown for the company by influential MP
Richard Cobden during Lord John Russell‟s ministry, Wakefield gained only modest
ground in government. Wakefield suffered a stroke a month after a disappointing meeting
with the third Earl Grey in 1846, leaving Charles Buller to procure terms for the
company. Wakefield seemingly never forgave Grey for turning his back on full
systematic colonization, as evidenced by his scathing attacks on Grey in A View of the Art
of Colonization.95 In 1849, Wakefield resigned as the New Zealand Company‟s director
and organized the Society for the Reform of Colonial Government in order to lobby
parliament for more self-government in the colonies in general. In 1850, the colonial
reformers tried unsuccessfully to pass legislation defining colonial and imperial power in
Australia. In 1853, the jaded Wakefield moved to New Zealand and the colonial
reformers‟ influence waned. Wakefield, though controversial in his motives, helped
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change public and government views of colonies as financial burdens. He publicized the
colonies‟ potential for profit, self-government and medium for the spread British culture.
His ideas trickled slowly into the southwest Atlantic as well. Though he concentrated his
efforts on larger settlements, Wakefield‟s ideas affected private efforts to colonize the
Falklands in the 1840s and 1850s. Even the haphazardly settled Falklands came to reflect,
to some degree, the growing popularity of Wakefield‟s ideas for developing formal
possessions. In the end, the clash between traditional and reformist views of formal
empire constituted only halfhearted efforts to fully colonize the islands after 1843.
Countermanding the ambitions of Wakefield‟s school was the sturdy James
Stephen. As permanent undersecretary of the Colonial Office from 1836 to 1847, he
helped create continuity in colonial policy through influence over his politically
appointed superiors. And many have noted that his stalwart resistance to full systematic
colonization and sway with Colonial Secretaries earned him the contemptuous monikers
“Mr. Mothercountry” and “Mr. Over-Secretary Stephen.”96 He distrusted the influence of
public opinion on colonial policy, avoiding newspapers and warning of the dangers of
uninformed populist ideas about the need to take, colonize or shed territories. Stephen in
fact agreed with the colonial reformers about the inevitability of the colonies‟ separation
from Britain, but his sense of paternalism and morality in the empire prevented his
support for unbridled private colonization. He sought to help colonies become
prosperous without exploitation by capitalists from the mother country. Most of
Stephen‟s colonial trade and administration stances were humanitarian and paternalistic,
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while still embracing many of the ideas of free traders and reformers. His overwhelming
religious nature led him to rail against slavery and subjugation of natives, which likely
led to his distrust of Wakefield. He believed that in colonies yet unready for selfgovernment British administrators should protect weaker natives who could be exploited
by men he considered shortsighted colonial profiteers. His opposition to systematic
colonization in Australia and New Zealand grew from the fear that opportunistic
speculators would force aboriginal and Maori populations into slave labor, seize tribal
lands and subjugate poor settlers.97 Stephen also believed that local governors, having
more intimate knowledge of their unique situations, should be given leeway to make
independent decisions for the betterment of their colonies. But he favored scrupulous
appointments of governors and colonial administrators: conscientious civil servants and
respected naval men, not ruthless capitalists prone to corruption. Although he did not
categorically deny the need for annexations like New Zealand or even the Falklands, he
opposed expansionism for profit. Stephen generally advocated the slackening of British
controls over colonial trade and administration, preferring flexible orders from the
cabinet rather than inflexible parliamentary acts. In general, he wished for more
amicable political relations with the empire as well as more voluntary and cordial
colonial trade with British merchants. 98 However, he argued that giving colonial power
to merchants bent on profit could compromise colonial progress. Likewise, Stephen
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sought to end the granting of governorships as gifts to high-ranking naval personnel on
half-pay or other connected individuals. Stephen endorsed military governorships only in
“colonies exposed to danger from within or without.”99 One can see such an example in
the Falklands, where he endorsed appointments for naval and other military personnel
because of rampant piracy from outside and the lawlessness within. He generally
approved of naval men for these roles (especially in very small bases and colonies) as
internal reforms after 1815 created a more professional image for lower-ranking naval
personnel. In such places he favored civilian self-government only where feasible and
with oversight by the Colonial Office. 100 As a reformer of Colonial Office practices,
Stephen did embrace free trade, and readily admired free trade administrators like Lord
John Russell and William Huskisson. But he viewed with suspicion any actions that
might threaten the improvement of settler or aboriginal life. 101 Despite Stephen‟s
vigilance, Lord John Russell‟s administration would encourage more private interest in
the Falklands and in the empire at large after Stephen‟s retirement in 1847.
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CHAPTER THREE
TAKEOVER, STAGNATION AND TRANSITION
Government and Ground Level Appraisals of the Falkland Islands’ Potential
Pitifully slow advancement of the settlement marred the Falklands’ first phase of
development from 1833 to 1838. Government thrift, apathy and mounting tensions
between the Colonial Office and private interests over government-run colonization
characterized a second, transitional period from 1838 to 1843. The final period, 1843 to
1851, saw more concerted, but only mildly successful efforts to develop a colony.
Though the crown accepted the Falklands as an official colony by appointing Richard
Clement Moody as governor in 1843, private economic interests dominated the islands in
this era. Lord John Russell’s government solidified private control of the islands’
development by chartering of the Falkland Islands Company in 1851.
The word colony did not apply to the Falklands in the first decade of British naval
occupation, if by that term, one means a territory enjoying British civilian law and
benefiting from an infusion of British emigration and social institutions. Halfhearted
bureaucratic enthusiasm for and raucous opposition to extensive colonial spending by a
persuasive minority in parliament led to neglect of the islands in the 1830s. As a result,
little evolution of any strategic or commercial role for the Falklands ensued. Moreover,
the volume of red tape and the number of groups involved in colonial decisions (lamented
by James Stephen) led to confusion and sluggish growth early on at Port Louis. 1 Even
after an exhaustive two-year investigation of the Falklands’ potential, the colonization
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process from 1843 to 1851 experienced great difficulty. A lack of concrete plans and a
variety of domestic and Continental economic and political issues distracted or turned
successive governments away from developing the islands. Moreover, many British
taxpayers begrudged the cost of such distant and seemingly worthless annexations. 2
So what potential utility did the Falkland Islands hold in the early 1830s to
prompt Britain to hold on to them? The Liberal Sir George Cornewall Lewis’s 1841
Essay on the Government of Dependencies listed the six advantages of efficiently
maintaining colonial possessions: tribute, military assistance, trade facilities, outlets for
emigration, facilities for the transportation of criminals, and national prestige. Of the six,
he said that the first five would exist even if dependencies became independent while he
refused to endorse the sixth as sheer frivolity. 3 The Falklands in the 1830s, attended to
by the Royal Navy, might have fulfilled these goals, but did not. Barry Gough, in ―The
British Reoccupation and Colonization of the Falkland Islands, or Malvinas, 1832-1843‖
(1990) analyzed the promise held by the islands in assisting naval interests. First, the
navy needed the islands in order to check naval aggression by the United States, France
and Argentina in the southwest Atlantic. Second, this station would protect British naval
and merchant shipping and trading around the Southern Cone. 4 Gough’s theme is
narrower than Lewis’s, as it focuses more strictly on naval concerns, but both agree that
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island bases offered a host of potential rewards for the British. For example, Lieutenant
Henry Smith, the first naval steward at Port Louis, wrote repeatedly to the Admiralty that
in addition to their strategic value, the Falklands could be used to harden sailors for
warships. But the British government of the early 1830s largely overlooked such advice. 5
Parliamentary and public interest in colonial activity in the Falklands began to trickle
down to the garrison and settlers only in the late 1830s and early 1840s. Because of the
hesitancy of the government to bolster the new station, one finds only small morsels of
substantive discourse in parliament about their settlement. As a result, this discussion of
the Falklands’ progress from 1833 to 1843 relies heavily on personal accounts, the few
parliamentary discussions about the islands, naval and civilian surveyors’ dispatches, and
Colonial and Foreign Office documents.
With the changing of three ministries in ten months in 1835 and the political
unsteadiness of the post-1832 Reform Bill era, the miniscule Falklands settlement
produced little interest among the political leaders of the Foreign and Colonial Offices.
Utilitarian radicals, colonial reformers and free traders in parliament exerted pressure on
successive cabinets to downsize naval costs. For many parliamentarians and cabinet
officials, the Admiralty’s requests to provide extra supplies or salary increases generally
ranked lower than solving domestic economic distress or monitoring Continental politics.
As a result, expenditures for distant naval stations regularly sagged. 6 During the 1830s
and 1840s reformers and utilitarians in parliament such as Joseph Hume, Edward Bulwer5
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Lytton, Richard Cobden, William Cobbett, Charles Buller and William Molesworth
remonstrated with the Admiralty over naval estimates each time they arose for approval. 7
For example, on 17 February 1834, Cobbett vehemently objected to Secretary to the
Admiralty Sir James Graham’s request for £4,000,000 for naval supplies, citing unsolved
domestic distress. Graham rebuked Cobbett by noting that the Commons had already
consistently reduced naval expenditures over the last several years. He further averred
that the Admiralty had already placed many men on half-pay and ordered that there
should be only one naval officer promoted for every three vacancies. 8 In March 1835,
while praising the consistent reduction of total military costs since 1828, the Whig MP
Henry Labouchere and Sir Edward Codrington explained the inadequacy of half-pay and
pointed out that the government regularly overburdened and undersupplied the navy.
Hume and Buller countered that commerce had been successfully protected since 1830
with an average of 20,600 naval men and that without the large-scale security problems
created by Greece and South America a decade earlier, no reason remained to increase
expenditures or personnel numbers. 9 William Molesworth, speaking in the Commons in
1849, retrospectively summed up many of the criticisms of maintaining small possessions
taken since 1789. He argued that the British did not inherit most of these new small
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stations but took them irresponsibly and often forcefully; that the British misjudged the
ability of certain stations to foil mercantile and defensive competitors; that they used
some stations as mere convict colonies; that an inefficient Colonial Office used
authoritarianism and obscurity in administering them and that faulty logic led many to
believe ownership of more territory somehow equaled more strength and prestige.
Essentially, he said, ―[Britain’s] colonial empire consisted chiefly of conquered
provinces, garrison towns and gaols.‖10 His complaints characterize the nature of
parliamentary debates about empire in general. A major part of this debate included
naval expenditures and the navy’s role in protecting commerce and the empire from the
early 1830s onward. Britain’s naval strength and global empire (both formal and
informal) helped shape its self-image. But with mounting economic distress in the 1830s
and 1840s, distant stations like the Falklands presented a great dilemma for British
identity and the Treasury. High taxes to provide for the navy and far-off colonies seemed
immoderate in spite of any potential security or financial benefits they offered.11 Thus,
disagreement over naval and colonial expenditures severely impeded naval stewards in
developing the Falklands throughout the first decade of British ownership.
Though the Foreign and Colonial Offices agreed to take the Falklands in order to
prevent their acquisition by competitors, the islands’ improvement was not of major
concern. However, numerous surveyors, merchants, diplomats and navy men who visited
or inquired about them saw more than just a question of sovereignty and reluctant
10
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annexation, and they encouraged development of the settlement. Early on, British
chargés in Buenos Aires Woodbine Parish (1825-1832) and Sir William Gore Ouseley
(1832-1850), the merchant G. T. Whitington and many Royal Navy men saw the
Falklands’ practical uses. They could be used to protect the Cape Horn route for
merchants, emigrants and even convicts bound for Australia. The islands could also
serve as a refitting station for British ships coming from the Pacific to Buenos Aires,
Montevideo, Rio de Janiero and to Britain by way of the Horn. Additionally, the islands
could help choke off any French, Spanish, Argentine or American water routes near the
southern cone in case of direct warfare with any or all of them. The settlement held the
potential for some profit, supported by reports of abundant wild cattle, a reasonable
amount of arable farmland and plentiful fishing, whaling and sealing regions nearby. 12
After conducting a survey of the Falklands in the spring of 1833, Captain Robert FitzRoy
of the H.M.S. Beagle reported to the Foreign Office that ―in the outward appearance of
the Falkland Islands, there [was] nothing by which a stranger would be much interested‖
but that they ―[were] advantageously situated‖ for commerce and ―only require to be
generally known.‖13 The Falklands could also be used for small emigrating parties in
helping to alleviate surplus population in Britain (albeit in a small way), or even a penal
colony—unhindered by aboriginal presence or ease of escape. Captain James Onslow
pointed out that the interior, particularly of East Falkland, provided proper land and
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climate for growing vegetables and raising sheep, as well as an abundance of wild cattle,
ducks, geese, pigs, rabbits and some horses for future settlers.14 Commodore Francis
Mason advised the Admiralty in 1834 that if military prospects for the islands fell
through, Britain should consider chartering the islands out in private grants because they
held ―substantial value.‖15 Finally, the Falklands, taken during a supposed period of
aversion to formal annexations, reminded the British of their naval superiority and wideranging territorial possessions. Darwin wrote in the late 1830s about his survey of the
Falklands: ―it is impossible for an Englishman to behold these distant colonies, without a
high pride and satisfaction. To hoist the British flag, seems to draw with it as a certain
consequence, wealth, prosperity, and civilization.‖ 16 The navy began to consider using
islands instead of inland stations because of their versatility and lesser costs. In The
Falkland Islands, Compiled from Ten Years Investigation on the Subject (1840), G. T.
Whitington wrote that the islands were the only inhabitable offshore spot west of the
Cape of Good Hope and that they were needed to protect the overall increased number of
traders in the region. 17 Between 1815 and 1840, Britain continued to use annexed islands
as naval bases, including Ascension Island, St. Helena and Gibraltar, to name a few.
Though Hastings and Jenkins downplay the Falklands’ strategic importance in
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comparison to the other bases, they admit, ―from the moment of their discovery [the
Falklands] seem to have embodied the national pride of whoever held them.‖ 18
Naval Stewardship and Lethargic Development
Such national pride did not translate very well into early governmental or
defensive development for the settlement. Supporters of development attained few goals
for the Falklands, military or otherwise, in the 1830s. However, national pride and
potential uses for the islands outlasted utilitarians’ and colonial reformers’ desires to shed
the Falklands. But with virtually no official plans to reinforce the settlement, early naval
stewards at Port Louis made do with very little, while regularly promoting (and pleading
for) a more diverse employment of the station. The Admiralty initially hoped to create an
active station for protecting the Horn route in the more navigable and settler-friendly East
Falkland. This endeavor stalled owing to parliamentary opposition and hesitant
administrators who focused mainly on domestic unrest and economic troubles.
At first, Captain James Onslow recommended William Dickson return as interim
governor of Port Louis with another former Vernet underling, Matthew Brisbane, serving
as superintendent. Two months later, Captain Robert FitzRoy of the H.M.S. Beagle
confirmed their appointments at the settlement. Onslow expected Dickson and Brisbane
to continue Vernet’s enterprise.19 However, their inability to reinforce British
sovereignty or prevent anarchy (Dickson was given only a flag to show British authority)
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soon required the posting of a Royal Navy officer as lieutenant governor. In August
1833, their lack of authority and their practice of giving devalued promissory notes for
work sparked a group of disgruntled gauchos led by Antonio Rivero to murder several
Port Louis residents, including Dickson and Brisbane. Seventeen other residents escaped
to a nearby island at the head of Berkeley Sound. 20 Rivero’s crimes showed the fragility
of British authority in the islands. Onslow’s and FitzRoy’s misguided deputation of
Dickson and Brisbane shows a typical dilemma facing naval officers in the region in the
1830s. The Falklands’ remoteness frequently created disagreeable predicaments for the
Admiralty as officers there were often forced into hasty decisions without updated
instructions from London or Rio de Janeiro.
Despite such errors, more professional naval education earned more trust and
expectations from home in ground-level decisions by officers abroad. Throughout the
late 1820s and 1830s bureaucratic naval reforms included stricter accounting in estimates
and expenditures, growing attention to the actions of individual officers, reduced amounts
of fraud and embezzlement, increased parliamentary control over naval funding, the
adoption of a laissez-faire view by the Navy Board about the welfare and education of
officers (which reduced perceived tax burdens) and an emphasis on meritocracy in officer
schools. Such reforms created the view that the naval establishment and individual
officers had become more efficient organizers and more trustworthy. 21 The reformed
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naval administration, supervised by a more frugal government, produced public
confidence in both institutions, which also assisted imperial activity. The idea of more
systematic, qualified management within the navy and the use of naval officers to
manage colonial outposts grew more widely accepted by both the public and the
government. Thus, the government came to rely on the navy to administer the Falklands.
After the Rivero murders the Admiralty decided to establish naval stewardship of
the Falklands as quickly and as cheaply as possible. The British sealer Hopeful arrived at
the Falklands in October 1833 where the crew found and saved the remaining settlers
from the Rivero attacks. At the behest of the Commander-in-Chief of the South
American station, Sir Graham Hamond, Lieutenant Henry Smith left his post on the
H.M.S. Tyne and arrived in the islands in January 1834. Like countless naval officers, the
specter of half-pay had haunted him during periods of naval inactivity in the 1820s and
he desired an appointment that would lead to promotion and greater income. He accepted
the office of ―First Resident,‖ but even Charles Darwin, FitzRoy and other visitors,
considered him little more than the captain of a ―stone frigate.‖22 Some months after his
arrival, Smith and his meager garrison of four men finally tracked down and captured
Rivero’s band. Though the navy sent them to London for trial, they were eventually
acquitted for lack of physical evidence, returned to Admiral Sir Graham Hamond and
reluctantly released. Noting the lawlessness and the smallness of the garrison, Hamond
trustworthy image of the central naval bureaucracy at home, the effects of this change in perception trickled
down to all members of the naval establishment at home and at sea.
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sent vessels to Port Louis to check in on Smith on occasion. Hamond himself tried to
visit the islands in mid-1834, but stormy weather forced his return to Rio de Janiero.23
Smith chose to try re-establishing the maligned Port Louis instead of occupying
the former British settlement at Port Egmont. But much like the rest of the Royal Navy
in the southwest Atlantic in the early 1830s, he lacked enough men and materiel to carry
out the assignment completely. The Admiralty granted him seven shillings per diem and
full pay as a ―Supernumerary Lieutenant‖ along with a small allowance for rations.
While his allowance permitted him to accumulate enough cash to become the leading
lender to the islanders, it did not afford him enough to build a vital port. The Admiralty
and diplomats in Buenos Aires helplessly recognized Smith’s repeated advice that the
Falklands could provide supplies for ships rounding the Horn and a secure area for
British whaling. In July 1834, he requested that the station be properly settled,
recommending the importation of hardy fishing men from northern Scotland who could
withstand the climate. The government sent no such settlers.
In the first three years of garrison on the islands Smith acted largely on his own
initiative, receiving sporadic visits by warships checking only to see if the station still
existed.24 He came to rely on a small imported force of armed gauchos and their families
to protect the islands and his frail authority. He spread his miniscule garrison over
numerous remote lookout points in both East and West Falkland. They regularly tried to
ward off what he described as piratical American and French whalers who continued to
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poach fish, cattle and other livestock from both of the large islands. 25 Smith
understandably objected to the permanent settlement of any citizens from Buenos Aires
or Montevideo or anywhere else until Britain established a sturdy civilian government
with specific instructions about settlers’ roles in the new territory. His complaints to
Hamond showed the disparity between perceptions of the Falklands from up close and
from afar. Hamond and Smith chafed over what to do about fishing rights around the
islands. Smith claimed that fishing rights ought to be doled out by himself, not by the
British consul in Rio, who likely had little idea about local conditions. Between 1833
and 1836, Smith regulated and ran Luis Vernet’s former whaling, sealing and fishing
ventures in order to try to bring profits to himself, which led to Hamond’s irritation.
When Smith requested the use of a Royal Navy vessel to transport sealskins, Hamond
rebuked him, condemning the use of naval vessels by officers for self gain. Smith tried to
hand over his sealing activities to his son. Hamond maintained that he would put a stop
to Smith’s son’s activities as well. In May 1835, Smith complained to his superiors about
the barriers to his promotion after twenty-five years of service and that he had little
money or authority with which to create a proper station at Port Louis.26 Despite the
annoyance these complaints and activities caused for Hamond, Smith deserves much
credit for the upkeep of the sheep industry and attempts to continue Vernet’s work near

25

26

Gough, ―The British Reoccupation,‖ 274.

Colonial Office, Lieutenant Smith to the Admiralty, 4 May 1835, CO 78/2; and Gough, The Falkland
Islands/Malvinas, 113. Smith would have to wait several years after he was replaced in the Falklands to
earn promotion to Commander (1841) and until 1846 for promotion to Captain. But both of these
commissions were tied to his willingness to take on the early settlement of the Falklands.

60

Port Louis.27 His enterprise helped increase interest in the islands’ livestock trade among
investors like G. T. Whitington and Samuel Fisher Lafone in the mid-to-late 1830s.
Likewise, Hamond and the Admiralty increased interest in the settlement’s doings
when two other surveys maintained the legitimacy of Smith’s reports. In 1836, Captain
Sir George Grey of the H.M.S. Cleopatra came from Rio de Janiero to conduct a tenweek inspection of both East and West Falkland. Grey corroborated Smith’s suggestions
about the potential the islands held for both trading ventures and military advantage and
confirmed Smith’s complaints about the tiny garrison’s inability to hold off raiders. In
response, Hamond sent Lieutenant Robert Lowcay to survey the islands in 1837. Lowcay
warded off the French whaler La Persévérance from within three miles of the Falklands’
shores, which he reported to Hamond. Hamond then reported to the Admiralty that he
lacked reliable instructions about the territorial limits of the new station and that Buenos
Aires’s ships, supported by the United States, often illegally put in at the islands as
well.28 Moreover, the navy consistently found rival traders using the smaller islands
nearby. For example, American fishermen openly kept the General Williams anchored at
New Island as a depot for an American merchant who operated in the area. 29 Woodbine
Parish, recognizing the Falklands’ potential, warned Palmerston in July 1835 that the
Falklands’ desperate situation ―may be deserving your Lordship’s attention, inasmuch as
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I believe they may be made of essential importance to British interests in that part of the
world…‖ and that the islands were not ―the barren and inhospitable Region they were
long supposed to be.‖30 Sir John Barrow, Second Secretary of the Admiralty and
promoter of artic explorations, asked James Stephen in late September 1835 to inform
Colonial Secretary Glenelg that Rio de Janiero lacked the provisions to regularly send a
ship to call at or adequately supply Port Louis. 31 These requests gained lukewarm
responses from the Foreign and Colonial Offices, leading to great dissatisfaction for
Smith, Hamond, Parish and others who wished to develop the new station. Darwin,
writing in 1833, chided the Foreign and Colonial Offices and the Admiralty for placing
such a shabby garrison on a station Britain purported to own. 32 In May 1835 John
Backhouse, permanent undersecretary of the Foreign Office, wrote to Robert William
Hay, undersecretary of the Colonial Office, emphasizing the reluctance of both
Palmerston and Lord Glenelg to give more than marginal support to the Falklands.
Glenelg desired withdrawal from the Falklands, while Backhouse (at Palmerston’s
instruction) proposed to Hay a replacement of the garrison with two or three families
from the Shetlands or Orkneys.33 Despite blocking the plans of Glenelg and T. Spring
Rice, Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord Melbourne’s second ministry, to withdraw the
garrison and revert to the system of periodic calls by warships, Palmerston devoted little
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attention to the station in the mid-1830s. Palmerston warned Glenelg, however, that
thinning the Falklands’ garrison would ―wear the appearance of an abandonment of
[British] claims.‖34 After deliberation, Glenelg advised the Admiralty to keep Smith’s
force in place, but Smith still received little tangible support. He left the Falklands in
1838 owing to his inabilities to enforce British rule or to continue Vernet’s enterprise.
Parliamentary debates over the costs of navy men and supplies to protect colonies
and stations increased in the later 1830s. But parliament’s steady reduction in approved
naval expenditures from 1828 to 1835 changed to modest increases in the second half of
the decade for the protection of free trade in South America. 35 While presenting naval
estimates to the Commons in March 1836, Charles Wood, Secretary to the Admiralty
from 1835 to 1839, requested an increase of 5,000 naval personnel and stated that ―there
was no British naval station in the world from which there were not pressing demands for
an increased force.‖36 He also said there were only 14,000 naval men available for active
duty, which was hardly enough for protection against threats at home, let alone the far
outposts of the empire. He stated that Britain no longer enjoyed unrivalled control of the
seas and that the Foreign Office and the Admiralty had received increasing demands for
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naval protection in Brazil, Argentina and several other Latin American states. Joseph
Hume led the opposition, charging the navy with inefficiency, but Sir James Graham, Sir
Robert Peel and Lord John Russell parried his objections. They contended that Britain
should maintain a reasonable amount of peacetime naval defense for the protection of
commerce on the coasts of South America.37 The Commons agreed to Wood’s request.
Less than three weeks later, the Commons agreed to increase the salaries of naval pursers
and the half-pay of naval officers. In May 1836 they also increased the number of and
value of naval promotions. Time and again Hume opposed the resolutions. 38 However,
not until the early 1840s did such gains reach the Falkland Islands’ stewards.
In 1838 Lieutenant Robert Lowcay replaced Smith at Port Louis. Lowcay arrived
at the Falklands in 1837, bringing sheep, fowl, seed and instructions to survey as much as
he could of the islands. But Lowcay lacked Smith’s effectiveness. He had also fallen out
of favor with Hamond. Since frustrated commanders at Rio de Janiero blamed the
Foreign Office for the Admiralty’s unwillingness to assist the Falklands, Hamond and the
Admiralty therefore used Port Louis to banish the bungling Lowcay. 39 Hamond had
already chided Lowcay for his ―undiplomatic conduct, his failure to inform his superior
of vital information respecting French sailing movements, and his poor navigating
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abilities.‖40 Therefore, the Admiralty commissioned Lowcay as the commander of the
shabby ketch H.M.S. Arrow. Unsurprisingly, Lowcay did little with little.
Naval stewards received few of the naval increases in men or supplies approved
by parliament before 1841. Of the islands’ fifteen permanent residents in 1836, only six
comprised the garrison. In 1843, the islands’ population grew to forty-three residents, of
whom only twenty-two were permanent. Visiting naval officers pointed to the number of
deserters from merchant ships and the lack of females. They advised importing reputable
women to improve morale and to retain male settlers. 41 The government took no such
action and the population remained thin into the mid-1840s. Lowcay took steps to
increase his authority as officer-in-charge in 1838. He obtained signatures from all males
on the islands pledging them to obey British law and announced that exclusive British
fishing rights extended to three miles from the Falklands’ shores. 42 Despite receiving
slightly more funds to carry out his duties than Lieutenant Smith, he carried out his tasks
with less zeal, leading to even slower economic growth in the Falklands. Surveyor
Lauchlan Mackinnon, who served as Captain B. J. Sulivan’s first mate in the Falklands
(1838-1839), publicly praised Lowcay for acting regularly, albeit without much success,
in trying to halt illegal fishing and raiding by American and French vessels. 43 But
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Lowcay and his garrison also allowed the number of tame cattle on the islands to sag
from 350 in April 1838 to 200 in September 1839. Lowcay’s brief replacement, only
referred to as ―Lieutenant Robinson,‖ was forced to taxi between Rio de Janiero,
Montevideo and Patagonia searching for horses to replace those worn out by Lowcay and
his men.44 One could cite the harsh winter of 1838 as contributing to the death of both
sheep and horses, but only seven horses died owing to inclement weather. Lowcay’s few
successes included trying to improve Christian morality in the settlement and alerting his
superiors of the Falklands’ appalling living conditions. Settlers lived in mud or stone
huts, wore shabby clothing and engaged in regular sexual promiscuity. Lowcay tried to
curtail the latter by recognizing six marriages of Englishmen, two marriages of gauchos
and one marriage of another veteran settler. Lowcay’s tenure, though unimpressive in
material results, solidified a ―permanent watch‖ in the Falklands after six years of
neglect. Still, only the sovereignty debate with Buenos Aires gained any major cabinet
interest.45
Transition Toward “Colonization”
Lieutenant John Tyssen took over as lieutenant governor of the Falklands from
December 1839 until July 1841. Though still facing apathy from London, he effectively
laid the foundation for the colonial economy of the 1840s. But like his predecessors, he
beginning of Lieutenant John Tyssen’s in the spring of 1839. Mackinnon’s findings will be explored in
more depth later.
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could not establish a strong naval base at Port Louis. Tyssen continued the practices of
fighting off American and French cattle thieves and tried to build up the station’s defense
and economy. He granted monopolies on foxes and wolves to settler Charles Melville
and experimented with growing different vegetables as well as one hundred varieties of
trees. Most importantly, Tyssen reported to Rear Admiral E. D. King in Rio de Janiero
that the thousands of wild cattle on East Falkland remained untamed and untapped. He
attributed this failure to the weakness of the colony, lack of resources and the subsequent
inability of the inhabitants to obtain or manage these animals. 46 He would also later
allow J. B. Whitington to land with ships, supplies and English settlers who intended to
set up a salt-fishing settlement in 1840.47 He appealed to Admiral E. D. King for several
necessities to improve livestock management in East Falklands’ interior. Tyssen lacked
the hunting horses needed for tracking down wild cattle and building the beef stockpile
necessary for winter survival. Moreover, the inability of the garrison to protect the
settlers and Tyssen’s lack of directives in land sales caused continued stagnation in
economics. In early July 1841 King communicated Tyssen’s troubles to Secretary to the
Admiralty, R. More O’Ferrall, who was promoted later that month to secretary of the
Treasury. King sent with these concerns the equally unsettling reports of Captain Lord
Edward Russell of the H.M.S. Actaeon. Captain Russell noted the increase in the number
of disputes involving American encroachers as well as the number of merchant and
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distressed ships of ―all nations‖ calling at Port Louis. King asked O’Ferrall to consider
increased funds for the purchase of horses, hiring of gauchos, naval refitting supplies and
the creation of a ―properly-constituted government…with judicial authority‖ to be
established in the Falklands.48 Additionally, Sir John Barrow passed these concerns and
King’s praise for Tyssen’s effort along to James Stephen. Barrow stressed that Tyssen
had worked industriously to protect livestock from marauders and to eliminate piracy in
Berkeley Sound. He also conveyed King’s opinion that the proceedings toward full
colonization of the settlement should begin quickly to assist its vulnerable garrison. 49
Tyssen’s efforts helped spur the home government into seriously investigating full
colonization and addition of civilian administration at Port Louis.
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office increased its attention to diplomatic and strategic
concerns in the southwest Atlantic as conflicts arose in the Rio de la Plata region. In the
midst of French naval threats to Buenos Aires, Juan Manuel de Rosas offered in 1838 and
in 1841 to void Argentine claims of sovereignty in the Falklands in exchange for
forgiveness of the 1824 Baring Brothers’ loan to Buenos Aires. Palmerston rejected both
offers. Britain would not benefit from receiving sovereignty over territory over which it
already had ownership. Moreover, with mounting debt crises arising all over Latin
America, Baring Brothers’s bondholders would not stand for any further decrease in the
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value of their Latin American investments. 50 Additionally, William Gore Ouseley,
diplomat and consul in both Rio de Janiero and Buenos Aires (1832-1850) sent many
verbose letters praising the potential military and economic advantages of the Falklands,
which ―appealed to the security-conscious Palmerston.‖51 Seeing the only practical
island base from which the navy could operate near South America’s east coast,
Palmerston refused to cede them. He also faced regular parliamentary pressure to break
up the French blockade of Buenos Aires (1838-1840) in order to alleviate sagging
business ventures. In the Commons in July 1839, Sir Stratford Canning argued that the
blockade ―afforded a most serious interruption to the commercial intercourse of
England.‖ Palmerston responded that the Foreign Office was working to end the
situation diplomatically, but pledged no outright naval intervention. 52 In July 1839
Viscount Strangford petitioned the Lords on behalf of 300 British merchants, traders and
ship owners of Buenos Aires demanding Royal Naval intervention against France. Prime
Minister Melbourne flatly denied Britain’s right to do so, since Britain had rightly used
blockades many times. 53 It is probable that Palmerston, Melbourne and the Colonial
Office realized that the strategically placed Falkland Islands should be colonized enough
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to be a usable base in the event of outright war.54 At the same time several men began
bringing to the government’s and the public’s attention the need to fully colonize the
Falklands for profit, ship refitting, or even the establishment of a penal colony.
The naval surveyor B. J. Sulivan, with whom Darwin sailed in 1836, became a
major proponent of settling and colonizing the Falklands for naval and civilian use.
During the French blockade of Buenos Aires, the Admiralty sent Sulivan from autumn
1838 to spring 1839 to augment FitzRoy’s initially optimistic survey of the Falklands.
Sulivan’s reports showed so much faith in the Falkland Islands’ potential that he settled
there with his wife and children until 1851. 55 Additionally, Sulivan assisted Tyssen by
giving upbeat counsel to the Colonial Office about ways to develop the settlement’s
economy. Sulivan used subordinates, like Captain Robert Russell, to act as suppliers and
liaisons between Rio de Janiero and Port Louis. In October 1840, Russell unfortunately
reported to Sulivan that he could not carry out orders to obtain the horses requested by
Tyssen because of unrest in the River Plate. He also sent Sulivan an inventory of wild
and tame cattle, horses formerly owned by Vernet, sheep, fowl and other animals on the
islands, but pointed out that the lack of horses and reinforced corrals allowed cattle to
escape.56 Lauchlan Mackinnon, Sulivan’s first mate, wrote two books about the
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Falklands based on his observations in 1838 and 1839. The first, Some Account of the
Falkland Islands from Six Months’ Residence in 1838 and 1839, attempted to justify the
growing interest in colonizing the islands as well as stirring up more attention for private
investment and emigration. Mackinnon’s account applauded the ability of naval officers
to seek flexible solutions to the Falklands’ disrepair and proposed that the government
develop the islands in the interest of keeping France away from them. He claimed they
were ―lying in waste‖ with only ―a small British vessel of war to keep [the British] flag
flying.‖57 He described the islands as full of promise, downplaying the drawbacks that
detractors regularly cited, such as the climate, which he described as ―boisterous, but
certainly more healthy than that of England.‖ 58 He made only brief mention that the only
flat land for cultivating tall crops like corn lay in the south, where constant strong winds
might prevent their growth. He also deflected attention from the lack of trees and healthy
horses by stating that trees could easily be brought from Patagonia and horses from
Montevideo or Moldonado. Lastly, he blamed the hesitancy of merchants to land at the
new station on less knowledgeable eighteenth-century sailors who wrote too alarmingly
about the rocky coastlines. He said that if the government and the navy acquainted the
public with the safe and proper routes to reach the islands, merchants would take refuge
in the numerous safe harbors to be found, especially in East Falkland. He described the
anchorage in Port Louis as excellent, with the adjacent deep and inviting Berkeley Sound
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accommodating to vessels of all sizes. 59 Mackinnon estimated the islands’ population at
nearly one hundred, with ―good health‖ roundly enjoyed by crewmen and islanders. 60
On several occasions he lauded the amount of whales, seals and kelp available to
merchantmen. Additionally, he contended that potatoes, turnips, carrots, onions and other
vegetables grew easily and that one could procure hides and whale oil in great quantities.
But he most emphatically stressed the abundance of wild cattle, and the possibility of
exporting beef and tallow to British markets or using it for naval supply. He placed the
number of cattle on East Falkland at 30,000 head, venturing that these herds could feed
the entire South American Fleet if attended to efficiently. 61 He also highlighted the
convenience of a ―half-way house‖ to assist the ever-growing trade and emigration
between Britain and her Australian possessions, as well as being the only non-mainland
stop for British ships in the southwest Atlantic. While boasting British naval supremacy
in the world, Mackinnon noted changes occurring in Britain that would necessitate
colonization of the islands. British naval superiority fostered a new enterprising mood
and that, sooner than later, investors and the government should utilize the Falklands. He
also said that Britain had taken on a motherly colonizing spirit in the late 1830s. This
colonial style set apart British colonization from the raw exploitation employed by her
rivals in Spain and France. Mackinnon thus wished that the Falklands be developed as
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the ―Gibraltar of the Pacific and of the Australian seas.‖ 62 Though overly optimistic,
Mackinnon’s work displayed a growing private interest in colonialism. Such islands
could be equally useful for naval operations and profitable for merchants.
The expelled colonizer of Port Soledad, Luis Vernet, also attracted Colonial and
Foreign Office attention to the Falklands. Throughout the 1830s, Vernet actively tried to
regain his claims by repeatedly petitioning the Colonial and Foreign Offices and
providing information to diplomats and investors. In 1833 Woodbine Parish published
―An Account of East Falkland Island‖ based almost entirely on information provided by
Vernet. It sketched out the favorable qualities of East Falkland, including its potential to
act as a naval base and supplier of vegetables, whale and seal products and extensive
amounts of wild cattle.63 Though sympathetic to Vernet, Parish’s account failed to sway
his superiors, who keenly recalled Vernet’s and Buenos Aires’s earlier ―pretentions‖ in
the Falklands. Vernet received forgettable compensation from the British Government
for the horses he originally brought to Port Louis. In 1840 the Colonial Land and
Emigration Commissioners effectively extinguished his remaining claims when they
decided to officially investigate full colonization of the islands. Likewise, Buenos Aires
had continued its protests throughout the 1830s. For instance, after repeated attempts to
gain Palmerston’s support in 1833, Buenos Aires’s minister in London Manuel Moreno
sent fervent letters of protest to the Colonial Office in February 1835 and June 1836 to no
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avail. In July 1837, Lord Glenelg finally informed the Foreign Office of his agreement
with Palmerston that the dialogue with Buenos Aires over sovereignty should cease. 64
A new era for thought about colonization took root in government in the mid-tolate 1830s. Bureaucratic control over colonization, even in the distant Falklands,
changed dramatically with the increasing influence of Wakefield’s supporters in
parliament. Wakefield’s ideas for streamlining colonial governance and defense after the
passage of the Reform Bill of 1832 began to show tangible results after 1834. His
prolific use of pamphlets and speeches to pressure the Foreign and Colonial Offices into
changing their colonization policies prompted heated parliamentary debates between the
ardently pro-systematic colonizers and skeptics. An examination of parliamentary
debates from 1833 to 1851 shows frequent proposals in both houses for systematic
colonization. For example, in June 1839, the Whig G. H. Ward proposed to write a law
in the Commons to help alleviate economic distress through implementing a system of
price-fixed land sales in the colonies, setting prices at a ―reasonable‖ level to entice
reputable investors and emigrants. Ward supported the charges in Wakefield’s England
and America (1833) that the Foreign and Colonial Offices had mismanaged emigration
and colonization and implied that mercantilism had resurfaced under their guidance. The
magnificence of the empire, badly mismanaged in the late 1700s, had not been put to
economic advantage for private interests, nor had it been used to alleviate population
surplus. He also argued that seven secretaries had occupied the Colonial Office since
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1830, leading to inconsistency in colonization policy. 65 Viscount Howick, tempering the
radical reformers, stated his cautious support for the Wakefieldians’ concerns. But he did
not advise legislating systematic colonization. He feared that setting land prices by act of
parliament would make price adjustments or repeal of any ineffective laws difficult. 66
Ward’s and Howick’s arguments typified both the radical and the cautious capitalists that
tugged at the Colonial and Foreign Offices from the mid-1830s onward.
At the end of the 1830s G. T. Whitington made the first serious attempt at profitdriven colonization in the Falklands by a British trader. He raised awareness in London
among other businessmen about the Falklands and appealed to the Colonial Office
through petitioning and lobbying MPs. Hoping to spur government action by publicizing
his desire to colonize in the islands, he advertised the Falkland Islands Commercial
Fishery and Agricultural Association (more briefly called the Falkland Islands
Association) in a pamphlet entitled ―The Falkland Islands‖ and projected potential profits
on the basis of Luis Vernet’s former exploits. His most notable petition gained signatures
from around one hundred investors and traders in London ―requesting that a public
meeting be held to urge the expediency of colonising the Falklands.‖ 67 Even before this
petition and Laughlin Mackinnon’s accounts surfaced, the Falklands’ prospects began to
draw more public attention in London. Although a December 1836 Times article panned
the mud huts and ―ruinous stone buildings‖ at Port Louis, it noted the amount of fresh
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water, fowl, wild cattle, fish and vegetables affords settlers a steady diet. It also stated
that ―although these islands have been but hitherto unnoticed, they certainly are of great
importance‖ to vessels in need of refitting in the Horn region. 68 In January 1838, The
Times printed a more in-depth article encouraging ―many influential merchants and
shipowners of London and other ports‖ to look into a more private colonization effort.69
While these articles likely gained their background details from Vernet, FitzRoy and
other Falklands enthusiasts, widely circulated publications began to reflect and champion
entrepreneurial interest about the Falklands’ profitability instead of focusing only on their
inefficiency as a neglected naval station.
Whitington then requested that Colonial Secretary Lord John Russell allow him to
begin to privately colonize the Falklands with his newly formed Association, but grew
impatient waiting for an answer. Russell, the Foreign Office and the Colonial Land and
Emigration Commissioners found that the Falklands held enough potential profit to
initiate preliminary plans for investigating full colonization. Before Russell could notify
Whitington of these plans, the merchant had already dispatched his brother, J. B.
Whitington, to the islands along with two ships, supplies and settlers to set up a salt-
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prepared everything ready for the industry of man, with the superiority of important adjacent markets.‖
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fishing business in Port Louis. A surprised Lieutenant Tyssen allowed the party to land
in January 1841 and set up shop, but he refused to recognize the deed to the land parcels
claimed by the Whitingtons without further orders from his superiors. 70 G. T. Whitington
later tried to gain absolution in his own 1843 bankruptcy case by noting his unrecognized
deeds to Vernet’s possessions. He accused Lord Russell’s successor, Lord Stanley, and
―his undersecretary‖ (a sniping reference at James Stephen), of refusing his Falklands
claims for fear of reopening the sovereignty dispute with Buenos Aires. 71
Russell’s decision to investigate full government-sponsored colonization began a
debate over whether government or investors should develop the Falklands. Both ideas
angered Buenos Aires. In March 1841, the Foreign Office instructed its minister of
affairs in Buenos Aires, John Henry Mandeville, to notify the Argentines that the British
government intended to officially colonize the Falkland Islands and establish civilian
government there. In mid-December 1841, Buenos Aires’s minister in London Manuel
Moreno protested angrily to Palmerston, revisiting Vernet’s deed and Argentine
inheritance. He demanded that before completing this venture Britain should cede to
Buenos Aires the rights to East Falkland Island, or substantial monetary compensation at
minimum. The Earl of Aberdeen, having replaced Lord Palmerston as Foreign Secretary
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in September 1841, firmly defended British claims. Likewise, after having received
Moreno’s note on 24 December, Lord Stanley (replacing Lord John Russell as colonial
secretary in September 1841) and James Stephen confirmed their agreement with
Aberdeen that the Falklands belonged to the crown.72 In a note in January 1842, Lord
Stanley expressed this belief to the Foreign Office, stating ―in view of the measures
recently adopted by the Colonial Office for establishing a regular system of colonization,
[I] considered it absolutely necessary to insist most positively on the validity of [British]
claims.‖ Moreno again launched furious but futile complaints to Aberdeen in February
and March 1842.73 Most importantly, the Colonial and Foreign Offices finally agreed to
back a full investigation into colonizing the Falklands.
Just before his replacement as Colonial Secretary, Lord John Russell instructed
the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners to read reports from Captain FitzRoy,
islanders and other naval officers about the Falklands’ promise. The commissioners
found four major reasons for endorsing a permanent settlement in the Falklands: First, the
islands could serve as a place of refit and re-supply for British merchants operating
around the Horn. Second, they could act as a mid-way point between Britain’s naval
bases in the Pacific and the South American station at Rio de Janiero. Third, they could
function as a penal colony, taking pressure off of the Australian colonies that continually
protested the influx of criminal immigrants. Finally, they could, with development,
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provide agricultural supplies and even act as a small center of commerce. 74 The
Commissioners grew doubtful about farming prospects because of reports of poor soil
and the harsh climate, but they supported possibilities in fishing and sealing, herding
sheep and managing wild cattle. Russell overlooked their first recommendation of a
forming a penal colony, fearing it would scare away decent merchants looking to settle or
stop over there. Furthermore, he gained the support of the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty when he explained that parliament would fund the initial colonization process
and that the costs would not overburden any one department of the government. 75 He
anointed a designee to investigate the economic and military potential of the islands in
greater detail. On 23 August 1841 Russell conferred upon twenty-eight-year-old
Lieutenant Richard Clement Moody of the Royal Engineers the title ―Lieutenant
Governor‖ of the Falkland Islands, which connoted more authority than the tentative
titles ―First Resident‖ or ―Naval Officer in Charge‖ given to Moody’s predecessors.76
Russell’s initial goals for Moody, however, exhibited caution in considering full
colonization. Moody’s first directives included only sizing up the islands and reporting
to the Colonial Office and Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners whether they
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could or should be fully colonized, or if efforts should be confined to protecting the best
harbors for British trading, refitting or naval usage. 77
The Colonial Office considered Moody little more than a glorified surveyor from
1841 to 1843, at which time the government approved full colonization. Instructions sent
by the Colonial and Foreign Offices and by the Admiralty to Moody (January 1842-July
1848) and his successor George Rennie (July 1848-July 1855) still left much room for
interpretation. Russell wrote to Moody: ―In the commencement your government must
be one of influence, persuasion and example, rather than of direct authority…. As the
head of the local society, and the representative of your Sovereign, you will, during the
infancy of the settlement, probably find the means of maintaining peace, and promoting
industry and good will [through this method].‖78 Russell also instructed Moody to act as
a limited dictator for a short period and to commence a search for a suitable magistrate or
judge among the islanders to create a framework for civilian government. 79 But the
unruly and uneducated nature of the islanders made these orders difficult to fulfill.
Russell also indicated that Moody’s term would last only a year or two until the
government decided whether to appoint a more permanent governor or to hand the
enterprise over to private interests. Russell approached the Falklands as a test case for
deciding the merits of paternalistic or Wakefieldian practices in small outpost
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settlements. He enclosed in Moody's conferral a report from the Colonial Land and
Emigration Commissioners to help guide Moody in land distribution. Russell’s
instructions and this report in fact helped define Moody’s jurisdiction in parceling out
land. However, the instructions failed to fully regiment the distribution process, a
constant point of perplexity for stewards of the Falklands. In the end of the conferral,
Russell made plain his high expectations of Moody: ―It is the object of Her Majesty’s
Government to give increased protection and security to British commerce, and not to
launch into a large expense for the sake of the mere territory contained in the Falkland
Islands. Your despatches will be framed with a view to give information which may
guide Her Majesty in her ultimate decision.‖ 80 Even with such words of confidence, in
Russell’s view, colonization for its own sake was neither proper nor economical: the
islands and administrators must prove deserving of any luxuries. Therefore, the
investigation was to be done as cheaply as possible. It commenced with Moody’s small
stipend of £2000 per year, only £600 of which would make up his salary, and continued
with tightfisted funding from London throughout.
Moody arrived in Port Louis aboard the H.M.S. Hebe in early 1842, with twelve
sappers and miners (two of whose families accompanied them), a Mr. Robinson to act as
clerk and storekeeper, two servants, a butcher and four non-commissioned officers,
bringing the population of Port Louis to sixty-one.81 He commenced his survey of and
attempts to improve the islands immediately and his reports gained notice. Moody’s
80
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reputation at home benefited from the respect that the Colonial Office and Colonial Land
and Emigration Commissioners afforded B. J. Sulivan, who endorsed many of his plans.
The commissioners generally recommended that James Stephen entertain Sulivan’s views
in light of his superb naval reputation and knowledge of the Falklands. On the other
hand, they urged caution, saying that Sulivan’s aggressive support for colonization might
spark hot debate within the Colonial Office. 82 Sulivan and Admiral E. D. King aided
Moody as much as possible in trying to populate and supply the settlement. In one
instance, King ordered a senior officer in the Rio de la Plata to procure and hire transport
for twenty horses, six Spanish saddles and five or six gauchos for Moody in Port Louis. 83
Moody also took advice from Lieutenant Tyssen, other naval officers and
Antarctic-bound captains about the islands’ best harbors.84 Moody’s first reports to
London contained both optimism and restraint. He reiterated many of the same potential
boons of East Falkland as those of previous surveyors. He included lists of resources on
the islands, including wild cattle, building stone, plentiful peat for fuel, kelp, land for
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vegetables, rabbits, waterfowl, some horses, fish, seals and the prospects of wool export
and viable communications by water. He also described the climate as mild enough to
forge a living. 85 His initial report claimed approximately fifteen percent of the land in the
Falklands was ―very‖ usable, forty percent was of ―medium‖ quality, and twenty-five
percent was poor pasture. In later reports, he amended these judgments of the land to ten
percent of good quality, twenty-five percent of medium quality with the ability to be
improved, fifteen percent of medium usage without prospect of improvement, and twenty
percent uninhabitable bog, which could only add to peat supplies. His report that settlers
could develop half of the land on East Falkland conflicted with the earlier, more skeptical
opinions of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners. 86 Upon further
investigation, Moody advocated increasing sheep importation and basing the settlement’s
economy upon raising livestock and fishing rather than farming. Like others before him,
he lamented the inadequate quantity and quality of horses and lumber on the islands. But
he said that wood could be obtained on the coast of Brazil or from New Zealand. The
peat, he contended, could be sold to Buenos Aires and Montevideo in which rumors of
fuel shortages abounded. He also claimed that rice, coffee, sugar, flour and lime could be
bought and transported cheaply from Chile and Rio de Janiero. He claimed that
communication lines could easily be established, given the Royal Navy’s abilities, and
that the purchase of clothing would provide the only significant expenditures for potential
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settlers.87 Moody’s reports of West Falkland in February 1842, corroborated by
Lieutenant Robinson, exuded much less enthusiasm. He intimated that West Falkland
could be used in limited capacity because the ―boisterous weather‖ and incessant winds
would hinder colonization and land usage. 88 Despite his lack of enthusiasm for West
Falkland’s prospects, he continued to back the development of both main islands.
Not only did Moody act as an investigator, but played advocate for a colony in
East Falkland in particular. He tried to allay fears of costs to the government and
potential immigrants and also tried to calm the islanders, who questioned what full
colonization might bring upon them. As per instructions, Moody tried to establish
authority without instilling fear. He stressed several points in an address to the residents
of Port Louis on 22 January 1842. First, he advised the residents to forget any
―erroneous‖ claims still held by Luis Vernet. Second, he wished to dispel fears among
the islanders of his appointment as lieutenant governor, since some felt he would try to
change the settlement in order to benefit Britain alone. In response, he ―took great pains
to explain to [the residents of Port Louis] the views of the Government [that]
contemplated their welfare, peace, and security.‖ 89 Moody showed less keenness,
however, in his letters to the Colonial Office about the quantity and quality of the settlers
already at Port Louis, describing many of the residents of Port Louis as possessing

87

Colonial Office, ―Lieutenant-Governor Moody to Lord Stanley, 14 April 1842,‖ in Falkland Islands:
Return to an Address, 30-32.
88

Colonial Office, ―Lieutenant-Governor Moody to Lord Stanley, 5 March 1842‖ in Falkland Islands:
Return to an Address, 13.

89

Colonial Office, ―Lieutenant-Governor Moody to Lord Stanley, 5 March 1842,‖ in Falkland Islands:
Return to an Address, 59-60

84

―reckless character.‖90 With the growing population of the islands, Moody entreated
Lord Stanley to send more explicit instructions on governance and immigration than
provided by Lord John Russell. Escaped criminals from South America and deserters
from passing vessels still comprised the bulk of immigrants to the Falklands throughout
the 1840s. Therefore, Moody strongly supported an organized program to bring hardworking, reputable settlers to the islands. 91 Moody’s reports, along with the advice of
Sulivan and King, influenced James Stephen and Lord Stanley to take small steps
towards bolstering defense and productivity in the islands. For example, in March 1842,
Stephen advised the Board of Ordnance to pay for a detachment of sappers and miners at
the yearly cost of £375 in order to defray the costs of clothes, arms, stationary, and stores.
The Treasury and the Board of Ordnance finally agreed in late February 1844. 92 But
drawing reputable British civilian settlers to the islands continued to be problematic.
Moody and the Colonial Office agreed that the Falklands required a more
attractive port to draw such settlers and merchant ships. After conducting a census of
Port Louis in 1842, Moody described the suffering state of the town, with most of its
houses built out of turf or on the ruins of older ones. Assuming that Port Louis would
continue as the capital, Moody and the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners
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laid out plans to rebuild it as the seat of government. However, they also concurred that
the more southerly situated Port William provided friendlier access for merchant ships.
A debate arose among naval personnel and Colonial Office members about the merits of
rebuilding the previously established Port Louis or constructing a new town. 93 The
Admiralty called on the opinions of several naval surveyors, including the Antarctic
explorer, Captain James Ross, laying over for the winter in the Falklands in late 1842.
Though some surveyors supported Port Louis, Ross backed Port William because of its
location on a deeper harbor than Berkeley Sound, making it more inviting for maritime
trade. Throughout 1842 Moody and Tyssen surveyed Port William to examine its
potential as a naval and refitting station. Moody became convinced that Port William
would entice more British ships to call and might convince French and American vessels
to land there legally, since they would be ―assured of receiving assistance.‖94 The
compromising Moody proposed a plan in which Port Louis could be rebuilt to avoid
uprooting the residents, while still opening a new, better harbor at Port William. Lord
Stanley overruled him. Stanley feared the ramifications of carrying out a two major
projects in lieu of swelling scrutiny over naval and colonial expenditures. In addition, he
subscribed to the conventional 1840s view that a colony’s prosperity rested on its ability
to accommodate shipping. Therefore, he ordered Moody to move the capital and settlers
to Port William and build the new town. Moody chose a site on the south side of Jackson
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Harbor (Port William’s inner harbor) and somewhat reluctantly initiated the move.95 The
Times announced the construction of the new capital in August 1844, promoting its
―superior advantages.‖96 The islanders criticized Moody for this move. Besides
resenting the involuntary relocation, most of them disapproved of Port William’s boggy,
uninhabitable terrain. The merchant J. B. Whitington refused to move from Port Louis,
even as late as December 1844. The colonial surgeon also agreed with him that the
swampy land would worsen the health of the islanders. Nevertheless, the majority of the
settlers grudgingly made the move, with some assisting in construction. Stanley became
the Falkland Islands’ official capital in mid-1845. In 1854 only one shepherd and his
family still inhabited Port Louis.97 Although Moody had generally enjoyed popularity
with the islanders, they did not praise his decision until a decade later. They recognized
that merchant concerns still dominated policy decisions and London still preferred the
advice of visiting surveyors or traders to that of permanent residents.
In April 1842 Moody sent a plan to the Colonial Office for improving the quantity
and quality of immigrants to the new capital. By concentrating on cattle development, it
opened the door for establishing the preeminence of the monopoly that would dominate
its economy and politics until the present day. Moody’s proposal read:
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Undoubtedly the best mode [of earning profit], if it can be effected, is to
sell all the wild cattle, horses, and pigs in one mass to a company, or an
individual, who shall at the same time become extensive purchasers of
land, an extent sufficient to ensure that the purchase of the cattle is not for
immediate profit, to the injury of the colony hereafter, by slaughtering for
hides and tallow, but that it may be a basis upon which to carry on
extensive farming operations, or to retail with profit to poorer settlers, the
company undertaking the expense and trouble of capturing and taming in
the first instance…that [the company or individual in question] be bound
to supply beef to the Government, and Her Majesty’s ships that may call,
at a fair contract price, which shall be previously agreed upon….
[This plan] would [not] only be a mutual advantage to them and to
the Government, because I also think it would materially benefit the
poorer settler, as he would be enabled to purchase an improved breed of
tamed cattle from the company at much lower price than it would cost him
to capture and tame cattle at his own limited means. 98
Furthermore, he states that he received notice of several merchants interested in moving
to the Falklands from Buenos Aires and Montevideo and who only awaited information
as to how the Colonial Office meant to sell land. Moody’s plan comprised a hybrid of
Wakefieldian and paternalistic imperialist elements. One private company or individual
who would facilitate immigration and industry would manage resources and profits. Strict
government regulation would accompany the plan, at least for the first few years. But
Moody recognized that the proposed company should set prices to lend advantage to
poorer established settlers and not just to benefit wealthier immigrants who could afford
the ―reasonable price‖ suggested by colonial reformers. In addition, Moody expressed a
need for more practical settlers (rather than scientific and educated men) as they would
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better suffice for the type of work and government the islands required. 99 The general
mood toward colonization of the Falklands at the Colonial Office leaned toward Moody’s
view. In October 1841, G. M. Mowbray, an assistant to James Stephen, warned him that
the only goal of private business was immediate gratification and profit, not the settlers’
common good.100 Similarly, Lord Stanley wrote to Moody in January 1843, stating ―I
should not be disinclined to treat [the matter of land and livestock sales] with a company;
but as the main object is to supply vessels with fresh meat at a moderate expense, I
should not feel myself justified in establishing a monopoly, without security against the
abase of its privilege.‖101 He added that no such plan would take root until the Colonial
Office saw to the execution of formal government and law in the islands. He also wanted
to gain the pulse of British interest at home through advertisement. The Colonial Land
and Emigration Commissioners likewise agreed with Stanley about the benefits of
granting a monopoly under strict regulation to handle the islands’ resources. 102
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The running dialogue between the colonial and home administration between
1838 and 1843 displayed the debate within the home government over whether to create
naval bases out of small islands, to find a trading niche for them or whether to keep them
at all. The seemingly insignificant debate over livestock, fishing and land in the
Falklands reflected the split within Peel’s Government over uses for such small
possessions. But Lord John Russell’s administration (1846-1852) decisively ended
attempts at creating a useful naval station in the Falklands, focusing more on plans to
make them profitable for capitalists. Despite the efforts of Moody and Rennie between
1841 and 1851 to improve many aspects of life for residents in the Falklands, only
governmental and mercantile interests received significant commitment from the British
government. As a result, defense and social improvements progressed very slowly,
creating a colony that benefited mainly wealthy landowners and traders.

November 1842,‖ in Falkland Islands: Return to an Address, 45-48. Dawson himself reviewed the plans
and said that payment of surveyors should rest upon Moody, whose closer proximity allowed him to better
gauge the difficulty of the surveyor’s work.

CHAPTER FOUR
SEMI-SYSTEMATIC ―COLONIZATION‖
Developing Colonial Government and Economy in the Falklands
In April 1843, parliament approved civilian government in the Falklands,
establishing its official status as a crown colony. 1 Early government structure
seemingly gave Moody much power. The Queen’s charter, adopted in June 1843,
promoted Moody to ―Governor of the Falkland Islands‖ and set up a legislative
council, on which Moody was to sit, along with no fewer than two other people. It
also established an executive council, elected from within the legislative council, to
advise the governor. The charter required all inhabitants to recognize the governor as
the islands’ highest authority. Moody received the right to use the Public Seal, to
appoint officials and judges, to divide and sell colonial lands with the Executive
Council’s and Colonial Office’s approval, to pardon criminals, and to suspend public
officers. However, a draft of instructions enclosed with the charter forbade the
governor from choosing the members of the Legislative Council, leaving this right to
the Privy Council in London. Governors could not create or change British law
applying to naturalization of aliens in the islands, freedom of worship, changing of
officers’ salaries, issuing bills on the colony’s credit, restricting the rights of nonEuropean members of the Falklands, granting divorces or pocketing gratuities. 2 Over
the next two years, with Moody’s advice Lord Stanley and James Stephen filled
1
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government posts on the islands. Charles Le Blanc and William Fishbourne earned
appointment as Stipendiary Magistrates at £400 per year in August 1843 and William
Henry Moore, a future governor of the islands, became Stipendiary Magistrate in
October 1844.3 Lord Stanley, William Gladstone (appointed Colonial Secretary in
1845) and Earl Grey (appointed Colonial Secretary in 1846) continued the process.
Gladstone promoted William Henry Moore and Henry Joseph Hamblin to the
Executive Board in March 1846, while Grey promoted Oliver Byrne to ―Surveyor at
the Falkland Islands‖ in August 1846 at £300 per annum, and Arthur Bailey to
replace him as ―Surveyor General of the Falkland Islands‖ in January 1848. 4 As the
1840s continued, each warrant contained more mention of the advice given by Moody
and his successor Governor George Rennie.
Britain’s economic depression from 1838 to 1842, continuing Irish radical
movements, the Great Hunger, the fight over the repeal of the Corn Laws, and the
debate over Chartism distracted the government from committing to fully developing
the Falklands during the mid-1840s. Peel’s second ministry put forth reluctant and
relaxed policies for the formal empire. They pushed four major goals: abolition of
the slave trade, protection and extension of commerce, maintenance of British
prestige abroad, and support for the existing pieces of the empire. In light of financial
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and political woes at home and diplomatic scrapes with France and the United States,
Peel opposed expanding military stations (or formal empire in general) for fear of
provoking foreign hostility. Most requests for expansionism received icy receptions. 5
This did not mean that most politicians or economists of the day necessarily wanted
to rid Britain of her colonies. As Knaplund states, ―most [leading politicians from
1840-1870] were pessimists, believing that the colonies would become independent;
however, they were not separatists. On this point the Conservative leaders
Wellington, Peel, and Derby, agreed with the Liberal Melbourne, Russell, Grey, and
Palmerston.‖6 Therefore, the appointment of William Gladstone as Colonial
Secretary in the waning months of Peel’s second ministry seemed to placate opposing
forces in government: colonial reformers, free traders and those with more traditional
views of colonial administration. His appointment set the tone for more private
colonization of the Falklands in last half of the 1840s. During the mid-1830s,
Gladstone had turned on his previously staunch conservatism, becoming a Peelite
radical. While serving as colonial undersecretary under Peel from late 1834 to the
end of Peel’s first Government in 1835, his support for free trade and colonial reform
grew. From 1835 to 1837, Gladstone also served on committees in parliament to
decide colonial military expenditures, gaining invaluable experience in colonial
finances and reinforcing in him the need for frugality. Gladstone’s service as Vice-
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President and President of the Board of Trade between 1841 and 1845 also shaped his
support for free trade in the colonies. He likely learned a great deal about walking a
middle course between traditional treatment of colonies and Wakefieldian theories
from the cautious and conscientious reformer James Stephen in both of his stints in
the Colonial Office. He also took advice from Wakefield, especially on Australian
matters. Gladstone’s relative amiability with both radicals and moderates made him
more palatable than the brusque Lord Stanley. When Peel appointed him Colonial
Secretary he gained a positive welcome in both the Times and in Wakefield’s The
Colonial Gazette.7 The Peel ministry’s colonial policy grew ever more sympathetic
to Wakefieldian theory and free trade expansion, despite clinging to some Tory
paternalism. Though Peel and Gladstone did not implement systematic colonization,
they opened the door for the Russell ministry’s expansion of free trade, colonial
reform and privatization within the empire between 1846 and 1852. As a result, the
Falklands’ governors received little material support from London for anything
outside the commercial development of Port Stanley.
Though cautious about complete privatization of colonial holdings, Russell
had internalized many Wakefieldian principles. His new Colonial Secretary, Henry
Grey, third Earl Grey, had consistently promoted colonial reform since the early
1830s. Being well known for consorting with the colonial reformers, Grey demanded
more efficiency within the Colonial Office and the administration of the empire. In
Grey’s 1853 work The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell’s Administration, he
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outlined the overall free trade policies of Russell’s government and its approach to
policies in each colony. He emphasized his promotion of self-government where
possible and just administration for those colonies, like the Falklands, which had no
hope of self-sufficiency. 8 Grey aimed to justify the extension of free trade and
systematic colonization and to criticize Russell’s administration for not seeing them
completely through. In fact, the Russell ministry consistently reinforced the
principles of free trade and reform in colonial rule. 9 These policies led to more grants
of land and trading rights to independent entrepreneurs and shippers as well as
reliance on local Britons to rule distant stations. Though Grey can be described as
more doctrinaire about systematic colonization and less sympathetic to native
populations than either Russell or James Stephen, Wakefield attacked him in The Art
of Colonization for not implementing systematic colonization more aggressively. 10
Grey’s and Stephen’s ideas about colonial reform for crown colonies coincided for
the most part, and the latter two men got on well until Stephen’s health-induced
retirement in 1847. After Stephen’s return to health, Grey continued to take his
8
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advice until about 1850. Stephen recommended more reliance on the Board of Trade
for colonial economics, which Grey occasionally did in the late 1840s. 11 Although he
preferred the appointment of the stalwart Wakefieldian Charles Buller to replace
James Stephen in 1848, Grey received the very capable economist and Oxford
lecturer Herman Merivale instead. Like his predecessor (to whom he had served as
assistant undersecretary) Merivale recoiled at Wakefield’s schemes. Merivale’s
famously published lectures of 1841 criticized Wakefield’s theories as unworkable
and opportunistic. Although he supported more self-government for colonies and
preferred a loyalty-based federation to formal empire, he defended the utility of the
colonies. His combination of sentimentality for empire, desire for colonial selfgovernment and economic efficiency in colonial administration earned him much
respect in colonial affairs. But, like Grey, Merivale came to desire the phasing out
Foreign Office influence in colonial policy. Finally, Sir Benjamin Hawes, whose
acceptance of low tariffs and refusal to join the Anti-Corn Law League made him
akin to Merivale, became assistant permanent undersecretary. 12 Although cautious
toward systematic colonization in several ways, these men generally endorsed the
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same efficiency in organization and finance as Earl Grey. 13 This shift in attitude
profoundly shaped the Falkland Islands’ growing role within the empire.
In the mid-1840s, the Falklands’ governmental finances remained in the red.
The Times reported in April 1845 that according to Sir John Bowring in the
Commons, expenditures had surpassed parliamentary grants to the islands over the
period 1841 to 1845. Moody received £2000 in 1841-1842 and again in 1842-1843,
while receiving £4350 in 1843-1844 and £9812 in 1844-1845. Bowring also derided
Moody’s expenditures of £6179 over the period from 1841 to 1843, overreaching his
budget in those years and handling the colony’s remaining debts through promissory
notes. In the next two years Moody exceeded his grants as well. 14 One can likely
attribute his overspending to payments for surveys and for the Royal Sappers and
Miners at his disposal. Moody’s unbalanced expenditures provided fodder for
radicals who called for fiscal accountability. Peel’s focus on more frugal economic
policies in Britain and the empire in the early and mid-1840s opened a path for
Russell and Earl Grey in the late 1840s. Though backed by some in the government,
protectionism and paternalism in the colonies became mostly obsolete after 1846.
Lord John Russell, a Whig and liberal, embodied the spirit of reluctant
government-based colonization that came to characterize the Falklands’ development.
While promoting private ownership and development, no cabinet ministers expected
the Falklands to govern themselves in the foreseeable future. Russell had served as
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Colonial Secretary and worked with James Stephen from 1839 to 1841 to reform
colonial government. As Colonial Secretary, Russell worked to eliminate excesses in
the colonies, including ending nepotism and limiting life appointments of governors
in (particularly white) settlement colonies. 15 But the reluctance of Viscount
Melbourne to institute free trade and colonial reform during his two ministries of
1834 and 1835 to 1841 led Russell and other reform-minded Whigs to support Sir
Robert Peel, who often acted more ―whiggishly‖ than the traditional Melbourne.
Russell supported Peelite reforms of the early 1840s, especially after the recession of
1838 to 1842, agreeing with Peel that free trade would help solve economic woes at
home and in the empire.16 As prime minister, Russell affected several major reforms
that helped frame the attitude of the Colonial Office toward the development of the
Falklands. He established a restrained and efficiency-based defense policy that
scrutinized spending by the Foreign and Colonial Offices for colonial defense,
especially for the navy. He reduced several major tariffs, including those on sugar,
and with Peelite support, repealed the Navigation Laws applying to the colonies in
1849. Regarded by some as Russell’s crowning achievement in colonial policy, the
repeal of the Navigation Laws, along with Peel’s repeal of the Corn Laws, created
free trade as Britain’s preferred foreign and colonial policy. 17 Grey’s Falkland policy
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leaned decidedly in favor of commerce. Consequently, the islands’ government
became ever more subjugated to the interests of the islands’ private investors, while
government finance, cultural development, law, immigration, the military garrison
and naval protection improved only marginally. Grey admitted that during Russell’s
administration the government took ―few measures of importance‖ to improve the
Falklands, but nevertheless credited Russell with being the first Colonial Secretary to
try to colonize them in 1841. 18 While Grey generally felt that the Colonial Office
should accept the recommendations of governors for local government, he also
looked favorably upon merchants serving in government in colonies in which they
invested. Therefore, both Governor Moody and Governor George Rennie sat
alongside Legislative and Executive Council members having ties to Falklands cattle,
land or fishing investments. For example, after Moody and Grey granted the
Montevideo-based merchant Samuel Fisher Lafone extensive land, fishing and cattle
rights in 1846, his colonial managers often helped direct local policy. 19 Grey’s
attitude likely led to Colonial Office disinterest in transgressions by large-scale
Falklands’ investors. Though Moody endorsed chartering a company to handle the
taming and management of cattle, he likely did not foresee the leniency granted to
investors such as Samuel Lafone, a British merchant operating from Montevideo.
Lafone both spurred and injured the Falklands’ struggling economy.
Information he obtained about the Falklands through Luis Vernet as early as 1837
18
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piqued his enthusiasm and he acted on it. In early 1846, the British government
granted Lafone much of the southern half of East Falkland, now called Lafonia,
which included some 600,000 acres, and rights to all wild cattle living there. As per
the agreement, the Colonial Office required that he improve his land grant and import
reputable British subjects to colonize the area. Neither came to pass until the 1850s.
The Colonial Office hoped some of Lafone’s revenues would help fund immigration
into the Falklands, but a court order followed that changed the deal to allow Lafone to
keep all proceeds.20 Lafone had promised the land and management of his cattle to a
group of Shetland Islanders. But setting eyes upon profits, he sent a party of his own
men from Montevideo, along with half-trained gauchos and paupers from the Rio de
la Plata, to slaughter most of the wild cattle for their hides.21 Moreover, Lafone broke
his 1846 promise to Moody to send a load of sheep from Montevideo to Stanley. He
blamed Rosas’s Uruguayan campaigns and the subsequent French and British
blockades. In addition, Lafone’s local manager in the Falklands, early on having
bought Moody’s stock of hunting horses, overworked five hundred of them to death
during cattle slaughtering operations. With no horses, no cattle-grazing land and
most of the cattle owned by Lafone, Port Stanley became almost wholly reliant on
often-inedible meat sent by Lafone’s corrupt local associates. 22 Both Moody and
Rennie complained of the lawless character of the workers Lafone sent to populate
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East Falkland. Rennie stated that Lafone had ―[degraded] a British colony to the
barbarism of a province of the River Plate, Indians and Spaniards being thrown on the
Government whenever it was convenient to employ them.‖ 23 In December 1847 The
Tmes published an account from the Nautilus, having returned from the Falklands,
which reported abject poverty in Stanley. It stated that government plans for
employing islanders and giving them ―character‖ had all but stopped. Alexander
Ross Lafone, son of Samuel and Liverpool merchant himself, sent a letter via
Benjamin Hawes of the Colonial Office to The Times to counter the report. It did
little to reverse public opinion.24 Rennie’s reports and The Times articles reflected the
expectation that British immigrants (or ―Britishness‖) should accompany British
economics and colonization into the Falklands, but they did not. Meanwhile, Samuel
Lafone had failed to pay for the transport of his unruly workers back to Montevideo
at the end of their work terms. Of the nearly 300 residents on the islands in 1847,
over one third of them worked for Lafone. Unable to return home, these laborers ran
free in ―the Camp‖ (those areas outside Stanley) slaughtering livestock. As
punishment, Rennie passed the Alien Ordinance (1849), which shut down of Lafone’s
operations for six months.25 The British government’s grants to Lafone in 1846
ruined all hope of government-based colonization. And though he never visited the
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colony, he became its most distinct investor, setting a precedent for absentee
landlords until the farming structure changed in the 1980s.26
Except for the increasingly authoritative, commercially driven government
and small improvements to infrastructure in Stanley after 1845, the town received
mostly apathy from the Colonial Office. Likewise, Moody’s attempts to develop
Stanley into the focal point of the islands met with limited success. After completing
the move to the new capital, Moody began construction of Government House to
create prestige for his post. He also ordered the building of residences for potential
British immigrants (including new barracks for his detachment of sappers and
miners), jetties and seawalls, a government dockyard, a crude road system, a
carpenter’s shop and a blacksmith’s shop. But many of Moody’s and Rennie’s
improvements never reached completion, as their costs brought reproach from
parliament and the Colonial Office.27 Although Moody enjoyed popularity among
islanders, some blamed him for Stanley’s lack of self-sufficiency. Its geographical
position separated town and Camp residents. A range of hills surrounding Stanley
impeded road construction and communication with settlers in the Camp. Moreover,
the large number of viable harbors on the south and east side of East Falkland, and
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the new capital’s far easterly location, allowed the rise of a series of small privately
owned ―kingdoms‖ in the countryside, mainly run by Lafone’s associates. 28
Lafone’s associates enjoyed relative comforts that the majority of the islanders
did not. Both Moody and Rennie made attempts to alleviate rampant poverty by
various means, including improving housing and wages, workers’ contracts and
small-scale farming. Moody renegotiated unfavorable contracts for a number of
impoverished indentured servants and workers. For instance, in 1842 he released one
indentured servant, two blacksmiths and a carpenter from their contracts with the only
clothes-provider on the island because the agreements resembled slavery. Advised by
the humanitarian James Stephen, Lord Stanley commended Moody’s decision. 29
Moody also acted independently for the betterment of the Royal Sappers and Miners
working to build and maintain order in the new capital. After rebuke from the Board
of Ordnance, he defended the higher wages and bonuses he granted this detachment
in 1844 and 1845 because of the harsh climate, lawlessness, desolate living
conditions, disrepair of the men’s clothes and the onerous duty of building a new
town. Fortunately for the garrison, the Board’s inquiry led to no cuts in salaries.30
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Moody met further resistance in his effort to improve the islands. He reported
that small farming needed improvement if the islanders were to be self-sufficient.
Though Lord Stanley refused his request for a public gardener in 1843, Moody still
encouraged islanders to try to grow trees and vegetable gardens. 31 In 1849 Rennie
created the General Improvement Society to assist residents’ growth of vegetable,
dairy, poultry and pig products and opened Stanley common for free grazing for the
residents’ livestock.32 Both men also attempted to improve small-scale cattle rearing.
A March 1842 report to Lord Stanley from Moody detailing his inspection of Port
Louis justified Tyssen’s earlier permission for residents to graze their branded cattle
alongside the government herd. The residents lacked the most basic resources to
build cattle enclosures for themselves. 33 Moody created a plan in 1847 to grant
licenses for tame-cattle grazing on crown lands within six to twenty-four miles of
Port Stanley, provided investors bought between 160 and 6,000 acres, and 10,000
acres if outside twenty-four miles of the town. He asked that applicants conduct their
own surveys of desired lands for rent or purchase (owing to a lack of surveying
funds) and pay at least £10 per annum for twenty years. The plan, extended by
Rennie from 1849 to 1851, intended to encourage the development of small farming
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and cattle rearing among lower class residents. But the arrangement largely failed
when overtaken by Lafone’s Falkland Islands Company in 1851-1852.34
In the late 1840s, Lafone’s large-scale cattle business carried on with no
checks from the British government, despite complaints from Moody and other
islanders.35 Between 1849 and 1851 the financially troubled Lafone convinced
London creditors and investors to give him fresh financial backing, with which he
created the Royal Falkland Land, Cattle, Seal and Fishery Company (shortened in
1851 to the Falkland Islands Company.) The company appointed Lafone as its first
director and his brother-in-law J. P. Dale as its first local manager in the islands.
Additionally, to further reduce taxpayer costs, the government granted the company a
royal charter in December 1851, giving it control over merchant shipping on the
islands and making the company answerable only to the British government.36 In
1852 Samuel Lafone sold the rest of his Falkland interests to the Falkland Islands
Company. After gaining control of shipping, fishing, cattle and sheep industries, the
company took over most civilian immigration by luring workers to the islands. They
offered ―free passage and accommodation, a reasonable wage, and a pension after
twenty years’ work for any young man willing to immigrate to the islands.‖ 37 The
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company did import an industrious population but killed all of the colony’s wild
cattle by the mid-1850s, which precipitated a shift toward the sheep industry. While
the company’s supplies helped end government rations to the Falklands and gained
the islands much self-reliance in the mid-1850s, it also tightened its grip on the
residents. The fact that several Falkland Islands Company members served in the
local governing councils in the early 1850s led some islanders to accuse the local
government of profiteering and the Colonial Office of negligence. 38 Along with this
shift in de facto authority on the islands to capitalists, Lord John Russell’s
administration grew more reluctant to build up military security in the Falklands.
On a larger scale, Palmerston, though largely favoring free trade, showed less
concern about defense costs than did Russell or Grey. As a result, the Colonial Office
worked with some success to marginalize his influence in colonial affairs, with
Herman Merivale and Earl Grey openly desiring freedom from the Foreign Office in
policy-making.39 Previous prime ministers up to and including Lord John Russell
failed to effectively control Palmerston’s influence in colonial dealings. Russell’s
desire to maintain a relaxed and inexpensive foreign policy often conflicted with
Palmerston’s willingness to use force in the late 1840s and early 1850s. 40 One must
divide Palmerston’s philosophies relating to defense in areas of British influence from
those of defending formal colonies. Though he generally wished to avoid adding to
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the formal empire, he showed more willingness to add and fortify territories that
could be used for British security and short, sharp (usually naval) actions to protect
British trade.41 His decisive shows of force often promoted liberalism in Europe and
Latin America and engendered patriotism and political support for himself. For
instance, in 1846, as Juan Manuel de Rosas’s Uruguayan wars choked off shipping
and trade, Palmerston at first supported the blockade previously begun by Lord
Aberdeen in 1845. But he ended British participation in 1847 because he feared
costly long-term entanglements in South America. Moreover, merchants in the Rio
de la Plata region complained that the blockade itself had started to impede business
and Palmerston the pragmatist decided to cut losses. In Europe, he gained little favor
with his provocative politics. During the 1848 revolutions and afterwards his proliberal stances antagonized Austria, France and Greece, diplomatic trouble for
Russell. 42 His abrasiveness with other powers after 1848, including the United States
and France, also dissatisfied Russell, whose free trade-based foreign policy was
nearly compromised several times by Palmerston’s overbearing style. Likewise,
Palmerston’s speeches in parliament supporting significant increases in naval
spending to protect merchants and colonies contradicted the views of colonial
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reformers. For instance, during a presentation of naval estimates in March 1848 in
the Commons, Joseph Hume and William Cobden strongly objected, with Cobden
arguing that the navy should be compensated as any other profession, like barristers
and physicians. Palmerston fired back:
…Wherever [British subjects] do establish themselves, they are
perpetually, according to the varying circumstances in which they are
placed, calling for the protection of our naval forces. Hardly a post
comes that does not bring me…complaints of British merchants, who
state that for months and months they have not seen a British cruiser—
that they are forgotten and neglected by their Government….It is,
therefore, not merely from the extent of our colonial possessions, but
from the annual increase of our trade, that additional naval protection
is required in almost every part of the world....I have often myself
praised as doctrines tending to peace, and which give to peace
additional guarantees; but they are not doctrines whose influence and
effect can be safely substituted for the more material and physical
protection derived from the thews and sinews of our braves soldiers
and daring seamen.43
In short, Palmerston more readily tried to promote formidable material defense of
small island bases like the Falklands while Russell, Grey and the colonial reformers
favored free trade to maintain peace within the empire. Palmerston’ correspondence
about the Falklands’ use as a naval base in 1832 until the early 1850s consistently
supported keeping the islands as a military base.44 As his ideas about colonial
defense diverged from Russell’s and Grey’s, especially after 1848, the latter two
43
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desired to eliminate his impact on colonial policy-making, eliminating the one
minister who was most willing to upgrade defense for small island bases. Moreover,
in The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell’s Administration, Grey wrote pointedly
about the commercial potential of the underdeveloped Falklands, but rather
indifferently mentioned their sorely lacking naval capacity. 45 Thus, Grey remained
true to Lord John Russell’s support for free trade by focusing more on mercantile
growth in the Falklands and trying to cut corners on military expenditures.
In October 1842, Lord Stanley had instructed Moody, as a major point to his
survey, to examine the possibility of making the Falklands into a self-supporting
naval station. 46 However, decreased Foreign Office involvement, little fear of naval
invasion by any party, including the Argentines, parliamentary thrift, and laissez-faire
reforms by the Colonial Office hamstrung Moody’s and Rennie’s efforts to meet this
objective. Although Palmerston and the Admiralty still saw the necessity of blunt
naval force and small island bases to protect British commerce in South America,
many in both Peel’s and Russell’s governments rejected such acts as detrimental both
for the Treasury and Britain’s move toward peaceful global commerce. From
Moody’s arrival until the Falkland Island Company received its charter, the British
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government stymied many attempts to build up or utilize the islands for naval
operations, even in times where they could have been effective. For the first time in
the islands, in 1842, the Colonial Office sent a non-naval detachment to defend the
Falklands. In March of that year, James Stephen advised the Board of Ordnance to
pay for a detail of Royal Sappers and Miners at the paltry sum of £375 per year. This
small group was to aid Moody’s surveys and to do what little it could to defend Port
Louis.47 In mid-1845, the Board called Moody into question for the extra stipends
and new barracks he provided for these men. Moody acquitted himself well,
asserting that they had not only lived with deplorable clothing and housing in a
remote place and harsh climate, but they also acted as soldiers, lawmen and builders
for him. He also stated that the men could not obtain supplies as cheaply as men
stationed in Britain. Besides further damaging morale, cutting their salaries would
leave them no savings upon their return to Britain. 48 Moreover, in March 1843, Lord
Stanley denied Moody’s request for two naval ships to help ward off pirates. In light
of naval overextension in the southwest Atlantic and overall criticism for naval costs,
the Admiralty advised sending one small gunship for the islands’ defense. 49 Given
the number of marauders and harbors and the large coastline, a single small brig or
ketch seemed woefully inadequate.
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Though restrained, the Foreign Office emissaries in South America showed
more respect for Stanley as a naval base than did the South American Station or the
Colonial Office. Preceding the Anglo-French blockade of the Paraná in 1845, Moody
corresponded with the diplomat William Gore Ouseley, recently moved to Buenos
Aires by the Foreign Office in December 1844. Upon hearing of a possible war in the
Argentine Confederation, Moody asked Ouseley in October 1845 for more munitions
and instructions in how to prepare for and assist in defense. Ouseley warned Moody
to be vigilant for carousing English and American deserter-privateers from the
growing conflict in Montevideo, but that Admiral Sir Edward Inglefield, commander
of the South American Station, would not spare any ships for Moody. Naval
operations on the Paraná had already overextended the fleet and Moody likely faced
no direct attack from the Argentines. Ouseley also said that Moody’s reports about
lawlessness, lack of defense and harsh weather frightened many emigrants (or
refugees) who preferred transport to the Cape of Good Hope than to the Falklands. 50
Moody’s constant protests about poor naval and land defense went unsatisfied by Rio
de Janiero. In January 1846, he appealed directly to Lord Stanley. He complained of
only indirect knowledge of the war on the Paraná, describing his exchanges with
naval commanders as ―casual and extremely uncertain,‖ and that he feared a possible
surprise attack from Argentina or privateers. He requested twenty-five men, twenty
muskets and cavalry gear. Moody received a pair of disheartening dispatches from
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the new colonial secretary, William Gladstone. Gladstone granted Moody’s request
for muskets and cavalry equipment but flatly denied the extra twenty-five men,
reminding Moody that the British government had no intention of building up Port
Stanley’s garrison. 51 In a separate instance, the Admiralty declined Moody’s request
for an armed schooner to patrol the Falklands in order to stop American sealers and
whalers from raiding for cattle. Though American expansionism aimed at Oregon
and Canada in the 1840s constantly irritated the British, both Peel and Russell
preferred negotiation to military action in solving these issues. With no love lost for
the British, President James K. Polk did little to mollify British complaints about
American crimes on distant islands. Therefore, with no real permission to use force,
the Foreign Office only mustered up an angry warning note to the Americans,
threatening to punish American ships that violated laws in the Falklands. 52
In the later 1840s many parliamentarians intensified their criticism of growing
expenditures for servicemen and seamen stationed in the colonies. In January 1847,
Sir George de Lacy Evans protested in the Commons that soldiers stationed in Britain
enjoyed few of the rationing stoppages benefiting soldiers in distant outposts. In
February that same year, Sir Charles Napier pointed out that reforms in naval
promotions had been overlooked for seventeen years, leading to naval
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overspending. 53 In July 1848 Sir William Molesworth launched a vicious attack in
the Commons on the liability of maintaining distant outposts. He listed Heligoland,
Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, Bermuda, St. Helena, the Cape of Good Hope,
Hong-Kong, Labuan, the Mauritius, the Falkland Islands and stations on the west
coast of Africa as chief offenders. He mocked the Colonial Office’s lack of control
over many inept naval men and barristers who served as colonial governors and the
lack of experience of four of the previous six Colonial Secretaries themselves. He
also accused the Colonial Office of opacity in its decision-making, implying that the
Colonial Office and its local appointees were trying to profit from the colonies. He
bristled at rising costs for the twelve strictly military stations, including the Falklands,
and their overextension of Britain’s military forces. He claimed that the distance of
these colonies from the empire’s center would only force the British military to
scatter its forces in wartime. The Falklands earned special criticism:
On that dreary, desolate, and windy spot, where neither corn nor trees
can grow, long wisely abandoned by us, we have, since 1841,
expended upwards of £35,000; we have a civil establishment there at
the cost of £5,000 a year; a Governor who has erected Barracks and
other ―necessary‖ buildings, well-loopholed for musketry; and being
hard up for cash, he issued a paper currency, not, however, with the
approbation of the Colonial Office. 54
Molesworth summed up his diatribe by again proposing systematic colonization in all
areas of the empire. Benjamin Hawes, despite supporting free trade and colonial
reform, defended the formal empire and the Colonial Office, in which he had served
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as parliamentary undersecretary since 1846. He agreed that self-government should
―be the rule,‖ and the Colonial Office had regularly granted it where applicable. But
he believed that in adverse situations, the crown or the Colonial Office should
manage colonial government. He argued that each of the bases referred to by
Molesworth had peculiarities that demanded case-by-case colonial management. He
also said that when he considered the number of new settlements in the South Atlantic
and Australia, the government had seen only a modest increase in naval or civilian
colonial expenditures. Undeterred, Molesworth continued his bullishness for several
more years. In another motion to lessen colonial spending in April 1851, he again
called for withdrawal of or contraction of garrisons and naval forces on many island
bases, including the Falklands. He reaffirmed Britain’s identity as a top naval power,
but said costly naval bases should number as few as possible and run efficiently so
that surpluses could be spent elsewhere. 55
Such staunch criticism influenced plans to cheaply garrison the Falklands and
frustrated George Rennie after taking over as governor in July 1848. For example,
the Colonial Office decided to defend Stanley with Chelsea Hospital Pensioners,
which was not their intended calling. Sir Robert Peel had originally endorsed the
activation of these pensioners for domestic duty in 1842 and 1843. The Duke of
Wellington and the House of Lords agreed to use them to subdue domestic unrest, as
they cost less than using regulars. Wellington, however, warned against their use for
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garrison duty because of age and possible infirmity. While the pensioners benefited
marginally from their new duties, the government gained between eight and nine
thousand servicemen on the cheap.56
Despite Wellington’s advice, six years later in 1849, the Colonial Office sent
thirty aging Chelsea Hospital Pensioners to Stanley to replace the Royal Sappers and
Miners. The pensioners voluntarily contracted for seven years to act as garrison and
police force to help control Lafone’s large number of unruly employees and defend
the capital. Their arrival reinforced neither the islands’ defense in any significant
way nor did it decrease tensions. From the outset, Rennie met exasperation on two
fronts, both with their leader, James Reid, and the British government. Upon
disembarking Reid denounced the wretchedness of the settlement and vowed to gain
redeployment at once. But after a stern reminder of their contract, the pensioners
tried to settle into the barracks and cottages Rennie ordered built for them in
Stanley. 57 Each pensioner then received ten acres of land to improve as a part of his
service. Almost straight away the pensioners chafed with Rennie over their poorly
weatherized quarters and their lackluster ten-acre grants. In fact, the Colonial Land
and Emigration Commissioners refused to pay £200 to build a suitable house for
Reid, forcing Rennie to house him in the barracks with the enlisted men. Moreover,
the land parcels promised by the Commissioners, though easier to cultivate, sat
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prohibitively far from Stanley with no roads to reach them. Because the
Commissioners’ and the Colonial Office’s instructions differed on which land to give
the pensioners, Rennie decided to try to appease the pensioners with plots closer to
Stanley, albeit of poorer quality. But this worked poorly as many of the pensioners
were tradesmen or laborers with no use for or knowledge of farming. 58 Reid
escalated tensions by appealing over Rennie to the Colonial Office and Colonial Land
and Emigration Commissioners in order to get more suitable lots. After a flurry of
accusatory letters between the two men, Rennie wrote to the Colonial Office of
Reid’s insolent tone and unwillingness to recognize Rennie as the highest authority
on the islands. Grey and Merivale, now permanent undersecretary, eventually sided
with Rennie, but chastised both parties for petty squabbling. 59 Reid’s instigations did
not end there, nor did Grey’s and Merivale’s dismissive attitude toward the
Falklands’ military garrison. In February 1851, Rennie was forced into reluctantly
mediating a row between the abrasive Reid and Patrick Byrne, one of Reid’s
pensioners. Reid registered an affidavit with the Falkland Islands Police and
Magistrate accusing Byrne of threatening him. The absence of the required thirteen
officers for a proper court martial (since the garrison claimed fewer than 100 men)
forced Rennie to issue ―Falkland Islands 4153,‖ apparently shrinking the tribunal in
order to handle the trial. Grey, with Merivale’s advice, disallowed the downsized
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panel, instead forcing Rennie and his civilian court to arbitrate the case. 60
Furthermore, Reid continued to clamor for the pensioners’ release from their
agreement, claiming that most of the men did not want to live out their old age in
harsh weather, on poor land and with low pay. Earl Grey denied Reid’s request, and
most of the pensioners resigned themselves to serving out their terms. In fact, after
their replacement by the Royal Marines in 1856, only seven pensioner families
returned to England. 61 Grey’s Colonial Office, turned off by the islands’ remoteness
and the infighting among the few colonists, soured even more on spending money to
bolster the military garrison.
Since vigor for a formidable military or naval base waned and only cattle and
sheep industries had shown promise, ship repair and provisioning became the
preferred and dominant role for the Falklands in the larger scope of the empire.
Records fail to specify when the first ship needing repair or provisions arrived at Port
William, but from the mid-1840s until about 1870, the numbers of ships arriving for
refit and re-supply rose steadily. The Board of Trade’s prohibition of old ships
rounding Cape Horn all but ended the ship repair industry in 1870, but by then the
islands had gained recognition as a viable stopping point for merchantmen. 62
Increased travel around the Horn in the early 1840s prompted measures to promote
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such industry. In 1839, of the 236 vessels departing New Zealand and Australia for
Britain and the twenty whalers departing London, the vast majority chose to round the
Horn rather than the Cape of Good Hope.63 Both the Colonial Land and Emigration
Commissioners and Captain Robert FitzRoy recognized that the Falklands presented
the most logical place to create a port for refitting. The closest friendly ports for this
purpose sat 1200 miles north of the Horn on either side of the continent at the Rio de
la Plata and Chiloé (in present-day Chile.) Moreover, ships rounding Cape Horn
already regularly verified their longitudes by sighting the Falklands. Consequently,
in 1840, 100 merchants requested a refitting colony in the Falklands as a midway stop
for vessels going to and from Australia. 64 In 1843 both Moody and the British
government resolved that greater navigability should determine the location of the
new capital. Therefore, they played to merchant interests by choosing Port William
for its deeper channel and better wind for access from the open sea for vessels. 65
A swell in imports from the west coast of the Americas in the later 1840s, like
guano from Peru and gold from California, helped increase the volume of merchant
ships rounding Cape Horn. According to Woodbine Parish, British exports to Chile,
Peru and the west coast of Mexico also remained high in the late 1840s. Between
1845 and 1850, Parish recorded that the value of British exports to Chile ranged
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yearly between £866,000 and £1,156,000, while the value of those to Peru ranged
between £601,000 and £879,000.66 Even if one grants Parish leeway in his figures,
certainly the numbers of ships rounding the Horn to support these ventures was
higher than in previous decades. Around the same time, the volume of trade and
criminal transport to and from Britain’s Australian possessions increased
dramatically. In the first half of the 1840s, Van Diemen’s Land (now Tasmania) was
flooded with convicts and transport ships coming around the Horn, owing to Lord
Stanley’s proposal to send around 4,000 convicts per year to Australia. Though Earl
Grey opposed transportation of criminals as detrimental to the Australian economies,
transportation of convicts to Western Australia and Van Diemen’s Land continued
into the 1850s. Furthermore, after the opening of China in the first Opium War and
the rise of free trade in Australia, merchant focus diverted significantly from British
North America to Asian and Australian ventures, bringing higher volumes of traffic
to the Pacific.67 As British industry required more raw materials, wool and whale oil
from Australia and timber and flax from New Zealand increased in demand. 68
American expansion to California and Oregon also created coastal ports in
which British merchants competed with Americans.69 With the economic downturn
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of the later 1840s in Britain and Australia, many people traveled abroad looking for
relief of economic distress or to engage in other business ventures. The discovery of
gold in California in 1848 and in Australia in 1851 attracted an immense volume of
ships carrying British panhandlers and investors as well. The influx of gold seekers
and a new Land Sales Act bumped up the value of land sales in Australia from
£370,000 between 1839 and 1851 to £5 million between 1851 and 1854.70 Laughlin
Mackinnon wrote in 1852 that even before the rush for gold in California that an
average of five vessels each day passed the Falklands and after the gold rush began he
claimed that as many as ninety percent of ships passing by called at the Falklands.
Correspondingly, the Nautilus, a 200-ton ship that also served as a mail packet,
became a regular provisions carrier for ship repair and supplies from London to
Stanley. 71 On a lesser note, the Falklands attracted some captains looking to commit
insurance fraud. After reporting damaged ships as ―cast away‖ or ―lost‖ they would
have them cheaply repaired at Stanley, allowing them to swindle insurance
underwriters and continue to carry goods around the Horn. 72
From home, Earl Grey’s intentions for Stanley had always revolved around
refitting and maritime trade with the Pacific and South America. In 1853 he wrote:
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The object of [occupying the Falklands] was to create a small
Settlement where passing ships might refit and obtain supplies, for
which these Islands, not withstanding the inclemency of their climate,
were considered to be peculiarly well-adapted, from their possessing
admirable harbours, and lying directly in the track of vessels returning
to this Country from Australia or the Pacific by Cape Horn. 73
Grey continued his praise by pointing out that the islands attracted enough shipping
trade and agricultural cultivation to merit discontinuation of government rations in the
early 1850s. He proffered the advantages of using Stanley as a refitting station by
reiterating the probability that the increase in trade-based traffic headed for Australia
and California would prompt more ships calling at the colony. Reports indicated to
him that after rounding Cape Horn, if a ship called at Stanley rather than Buenos
Aires or Rio de Janiero it could save about two weeks travel and avoid port charges. 74
After 1847, a year in which Governor Moody reported that only 24 ships called at
Stanley, the numbers of ships stopping at the Falklands continued to rise. Between
May 1847 and June 1851, a minimum of 124 merchantmen and 11 naval ships
officially docked in the Falklands, including 65 British and 51 American vessels.
Governor Rennie reported that in 1853 alone 60 ships called at Stanley. In the 1850s
the ship repair trade drew more laborers and settlers to Stanley than ever before. The
islands claimed a permanent population of over 500 according to an 1853 census of
the empire. 75 After two decades of struggle, the Falklands had finally gained a
concrete identity within the trading and shipping fabric of the British Empire.
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Religion, Education and Communication
One could reasonably point to self-restraint in manners and behavior,
Christianity, and formal education as ideals for much of early and mid-Victorian
society, even in the colonies. But the capitalist aspect of that society was the only one
to take root in the Falklands in the 1840s. British textbooks taught that even the
smallest colonies were proud ―offshoot[s] of Britain’s trading prowess‖ and
determination to achieve greatness.76 But Governors Moody and Rennie were forced
to promote social progress on their own initiative. They usually acted first and asked
forgiveness later, given their remote location and the unenthusiastic interest they
often received from their superiors. Efforts to bring significant numbers of reputable
immigrants to the Falklands faltered until the early 1850s. In parliament, Laughlin
Mackinnon requested that Lord John Russell grant the Colonial Land and Emigration
Commissioners more power so as to encourage more voluntary (non-convict)
movement to the colonies (particularly of the Scots and Irish) as they sought to escape
the lasting effects of the Great Hunger. Russell, Buller and other colonial reformers
opposed such action, contending that it seemed counterintuitive that funding pauper
emigration would help colonial economies. They argued that it would only flood the
colonies with the impoverished, dragging down colonial economies. It would foster
resentment among colonial subjects, hurting free trade and amicable political
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relations with the mother country. 77 Hence, the Falklands continued to attract mostly
deserters, criminals and gauchos, while being dominated by absentee landlords. With
few Colonial Office plans for sending civilian settlers of any kind to the islands,
Christian development, education and communications suffered.
Complaints of both military and civilian stewards of the Falkland Islands
always included the local government’s limited ability to reduce drunkenness and
improve Christian morality. For example, exports of alcohol to Port Louis in 1842
included 541 gallons of spirits and 200 gallons of wine. With a population
numbering fewer than seventy that year, this volume of alcohol might have been
intended to re-supply passing ships. More realistically, the islanders imbibed in
excess, given the reports coming from local leaders and visitors.78 As early as July
1842, Moody asked for a chaplain and permission to set up an Anglican church to
promote morality and spiritual guidance for the settlers. He admitted that even his
marines and crewmen often gave in to intemperance and immorality. He also asked
for a formal medical officer, explaining that the only real medical care administered
on the islands came from the occasional passing ship. Moody received promises from
Lord Stanley, but two years passed before the Colonial Office filled these posts. 79 In
1848 the Falklands’ colonial surgeon reported ―intemperate habits,‖ and in 1849

Hansard, 3rd ser., vol. 90 (1847) cols. 840-860. The motion to ask the Commissioners to aid in
transporting distressed persons was rejected.

77

78

79

Royle, ―The Falkland Islands, 1833-1876,‖ 209.

Colonial Office, ―Lieutenant–Governor Moody to Lord Stanley, 19 July 1842,‖ in Falkland Islands:
Return to an Address, 59-60; and Colonial Office, ―Lord Stanley to Lieutenant–Governor Moody, 26
February 1843,‖ in Falkland Islands: Return to an Address, 60.

123

George Rennie sent reports to the Colonial Office with similar complaints. He
pointed out that, owing to their alcoholism, English and the Scottish settlers lacked
industry, while the Irish and other nationalities showed only slightly more restraint
and diligence.80 Additionally, the Colonial Office approved the creation of the tiny
Falkland Islands Police in 1846, nearly three years after colonization began. Its
skeleton crew of constables likely instilled little fear among the growing number of
deserters and unruly colonists.81
Efforts to improve religious life and formal education on the islands moved
sluggishly as well. Before 1846, several outside sources attempted with little success
to nurture Christianity in the islands. For instance, Anthony Fahy, an Irish Catholic
clergyman in Buenos Aires from 1842 to 1871, heard of Moody’s and Rennie’s
complaints about debauchery and immorality in the islands. From Buenos Aires,
Fahy called on the British government to assist in promoting Christian virtue by
sending a priest to the islands every seven years. He received little attention. 82
Commander Allen Gardiner’s visit at Port Louis in late December 1841
prompted the first concerted effort to establish a mission in the Falklands. From 1841
until 1851, Tyssen, Moody, B. J. Sulivan, and Rennie all supported his plans. Yet the
Falklands’ population was not Gardiner’s primary target. His extensive travels with
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the Royal Navy had sparked his interest in ―civilizing‖ South American Indians. In
1838 Gardiner and his second wife, along with his children, traveled from Rio to
Buenos Aires to Mendoza, and over the Corderilla, eventually failing in his attempt to
convert natives in Chile. He then decided to round the Horn from Valparaiso in 1841
and turn his attention to a Patagonia-Tierra del Fuego mission. 83 However, he
proposed setting up a mission on or near East Falkland Island to support the
Patagonian-Fuegian mission he originally intended. The Falklands mission would
serve as a center for teaching Fuegian and Patagonian natives English and thereafter
they could act as interpreters for British missionaries on the mainland. In late 1841,
he wrote of the poverty at Port Louis and doubted it could be ―improved from its
present condition.‖ But he continued, ―Who can tell but that the Falkland Islands, so
admirably situated for the purpose [of missionary work], may become the key to the
aborigines both of Tierra del Fuego and of Patagonia?‖ 84 What is more, he found it
difficult to gain regular passage from Port Louis to Patagonia. After several attempts
to establish missions in Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego in 1842 and 1844-1845, he
returned to Britain for the next five years. In December 1850 Gardiner set down once
again in Tierra del Fuego, this time at Picton Island, with plans to channel supplies
through East Falkland. But the hostility of the Fuegians forced Gardiner to appeal for
help to Samuel Lafone in Montevideo, who Gardiner knew could send supplies from
his company in the Falklands. He also wrote urgently to Sulivan for assistance. But
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Sulivan, having just departed the Falklands, missed Gardiner’s letter. After receiving
Gardiner’s appeals, both the Admiralty and Lafone dispatched boats. Lafone’s
employee W. H. Smyley found Gardiner’s party in late October 1851 at Spanish Cove
(near Picton Island), long since dead of starvation. Both Sulivan and Smyley blamed
poor mail service for the tragedy.85 The diary that Smyley found on Gardiner’s body
laid out plans for a mission on Keppel Island in the Falklands to educate Fuegian
Indians in Christianity and British civilization. The South American Missionary
Society later funded a schooner for the Falklands mission in 1854. They set up the
Keppel Island mission, but put the island up for sale two decades later.86
The British government’s efforts to foster Christian development lacked
Gardiner’s zeal. Colonial Office penny-pinching prevented Moody from receiving a
permanent Anglican chaplain until his brother, Reverend J. Leith Moody, gained the
appointment in 1845. But the new chaplain’s strident criticism of the islanders’
promiscuity and intemperance created a cold relationship between shepherd and
flock. His scorn led to a general boycott of his services and an unsuccessful petition
to London for his removal. Moreover, the Falklands claimed only one permanent
church: an Anglican establishment at Stanley set up in early 1846 shortly after the
arrival of J. Leith Moody. The church was forced to share its space with the islands’
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only school until the early 1850s.87 Beginning in 1850, influential islander Thomas
Havers appealed to the Archbishop of Westminster and the British government for
English-speaking priests for the Falklands’ small Catholic minority. The first
colonial priest did not arrive until 1856, and only then because of Havers’s new
stature as colonial manager of the Falkland Islands Company.
As with religious development, schooling for the islands’ children advanced
slowly. The Falklands boasted no official schools until Moody approved the opening
of a makeshift schoolroom within the Royal Sappers’ and Miners’ barracks in January
1846. Once opened, the school exposed class divisions among the islanders while
reflecting differences between those maritime interests who settled Stanley and the
stock and sheep farmers who settled in the Camp. No children from the Camp and
only twelve of the nineteen children in and near Stanley attended the school.
Landowning and well-off merchants in the town feared damaged reputations if they
permitted their children to attend school with children of working settlers or sappers
and miners. In addition, with no roads, sparse population and sizeable distance
between the tiny settlements in the Camp, the Falkland Islands’ government created
no schools outside the capital. 88 To make matters worse, ―school pence,‖ or tuition,
cost 6d per child per week, a steep price for the working settlers and the sappers and
miners. With no formal teachers sent by London, Moody convinced an eighteenyear-old boy from a passing merchant ship to sign on as the school’s first teacher at
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£20 per year plus rations. Shortly thereafter, four of the children withdrew because
they lived too far from the schoolhouse, while two others quit the school to work at
their father’s eating-house. Another sailor briefly replaced the first schoolmaster,
earning £32 per year, but no rations. The Falklands’ government then reduced tuition
to 3d per child per week because working parents could not afford the original 6d. 89
The third schoolmaster, a Chelsea Pensioner, convinced Rennie to further discount
tuition for pensioners’ children to 1 1/2d per week. With only pensioners’ children
enjoying reduced rates and landowners opting to educate their children at home, the
school boasted small attendance. Furthermore, the prickly Reverend Moody set the
curricula, which likely set some settlers against enrolling their children, and in the
first few years, an average of only ten children attended. Stanley’s upper class
wished to close the working-class school in favor of one for their own children. Upon
Rennie’s advice, in 1851 Earl Grey agreed to retain the working-class schoolmaster,
but approved adding an instructor for the upper class. School attendance rose as the
Falkland Islands Company imported more employees in the 1850s, likely with upperclass schoolmaster instructing managers’ and landowners’ children. 90 Not until 1856
did the government furnish a proper room in the Exchange building and split the
school into two parts, with an upper school and an infants’ school. Even so,
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agriculturalists’ children in the Camp received little formal education. 91 This
stratification of schooling likely impeded literacy and social mobility.
Likewise, education, internal and external mail service remained inadequate.
With no roads, the islanders delivered mail, mostly personal letters, by horse or boat
to small settlements in the Camp or on the outward islands. Consequently, weather
and terrain caused significant delays in communication, even between residents
within the colony. 92 Correspondence with the outside world fared little better.
During the 1840s, an irregular system of mail service to and from Britain and South
America complicated decision-making for both Moody and Rennie. The Admiralty
and the Colonial Office found the Falklands too remote and too unprofitable to fund a
proper mail packet service, resulting in an unreliable flow of mail in and out of the
islands until the early 1850s. The Admiralty had taken over mail packet contracts in
South America in 1823, bypassing expensive commercial contracts. Because it
provided regular service for naval men, it also justified keeping sailors employed in
this detail off of half-pay. Moreover, it kept an active naval presence in the southwest
Atlantic to react to potential hostilities in Argentina and Brazil. Between 1823 and
1842, however, the Admiralty eventually lost contracts for mail service in all major
areas of British influence except in the southwest Atlantic. And during the 1840s,
mail between Britain and the Falklands usually changed hands in several ports,
including Montevideo, Buenos Aires and Rio de Janiero before arriving at London or
91
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Stanley. Dispatches and letters usually took three to six months (and even up to an
entire year in some cases) to arrive at their destinations. For his first several years in
the islands, Governor Moody relied heavily on the Hebe, his original transport to Port
Louis, which only called every nine or ten months. Even his use of alternative ships
for postal service proved unreliable and slow. For instance, in 1845 the Seagull
transported one mailbag from the Falklands to the River Plate, passing off the bag to
the Spider for transport to Rio de Janiero after several weeks in storage. After
another delay, it finally reached Falmouth aboard the H.M.S. Apollo two months
later.93 The inefficiency of this system forced Governors Moody and Rennie to rely
on unorthodox arrangements with provisioning ships, sealers and whalers to augment
communications with Rio de Janiero and London.94 Even though the navy chartered
the Nautilus in 1846 to regularly transport mail to the Falklands, Moody and Rennie
still resorted to using whatever ships called in Stanley to transport their dispatches, as
the Nautilus only called on Stanley four times between 1846 and 1848. In the
absence of a mail ship specifically granted for use by Falkland Island governors,
Rennie asked the Colonial Office to contract a mail schooner independent of the navy
to run between Stanley and Rio de Janiero bi-monthly. Despite the plan’s
unexpectedly favorable reception by Earl Grey, negotiations concerning Samuel
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Lafone’s sale of interests to the proposed Falkland Islands Company caused delay in
handling the mail servie issue. Between March 1849 and December 1850, however,
three ships (the Spider, the Kestrel and the Harpy) transported mail a modest total of
eight times between Stanley and Montevideo as part of a semi-enhanced mail
service.95 But in a letter dated 16 June 1851, Rennie cited that the most recent letter
he had received from London as having been dated the previous year. He complained
that certain incoming mails had been taken on occasion from Montevideo around the
Horn to Valparaiso and back to Rio de Janiero, where they sat for several months
before delivery to the Falklands.96 Not until January 1852 did the Falkland Islands
Company successfully contract a ship, the Amelia, to act as a bi-monthly mail carrier
between Stanley and South American ports. In fact, the British government only
appointed the islands’ first postmaster in 1861.97
A sizable increase in the number of dispatches between 1842 and 1851
showed greater interest from the British government and that mail service was
improving, but it was still erratic. Whereas in 1842, the Colonial Office’s Register of
General Correspondence noted only about two-dozen letters and dispatches from
Moody, in 1846, it numbered in the high eighties. The volume of dispatches reached
fever pitch in 1848, but fell to 45 in 1849. Unlike Moody, Rennie tended to send
more documents with each delivery than did Moody, actually increasing the volume
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of paperwork arriving at the Colonial Office. In fact, 1849 marks the first year that
the Colonial Office created an exclusive register of correspondence for the Falklands,
having previously combined the Falklands’ dispatches with those from Africa, the
Mediterranean, Hong Kong, Labuan, Ceylon, Canada, the Mauritius and
Heligoland. 98 But the irregularity in mail service between 1843 and 1851 shows a
halfhearted, if not negligent, attempt by the Colonial Office and the Admiralty to
communicate with Britain’s distant possessions. It also created great confusion for
Moody and Rennie, who were forced to make their decisions without permission or
proper orders. Some modest improvements to mail service occurred after the
completion of Port Stanley, as evidenced by the sheer increase in dispatches both to
and from Rio de Janiero and London. However, while concerns about the garrison
and governance comprised most mail to and from the Admiralty and Colonial Office,
reliability and regularity of mail service only improved in response to the Falkland
Islands Company’s rise in influence in the early 1850s.
Since most British officials denied the viability of local self-government,
islanders depended on their governor and the two appointed governing councils, with
the latter controlled by the Falkland Islands Company. The British government’s
slipshod efforts toward developing local institutions and defense affected more than
just local government and industries in the 1840s. It impeded the growth of religion,
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education, and communications. Thus, many islanders failed to attain the selfsufficiency they desired and moreover, many of them endured more than solely
geographic remoteness from their mother country.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS
The geographic and psychological distance experienced by the Falkland islanders
reflected changing economic and political values in Britain. Free trade and colonial
reform, the two overriding philosophies emanating from the British government and
public, led to Britain’s neglectful colonization of the Falklands. The first two decades of
British occupation experienced distinct periods of occupation and colonization. The
naval stewardship period from 1833 to 1841 was largely fruitless in both strategic and
economic returns. Undefined cabinet jurisdictions as well as domestic economic distress
in Britain left little impetus to spend time or money on the Falklands. Beginning in 1841,
a transitional period bridged the two eras that reflected the influence of radical reformers’
ideas in colonial and foreign policy choices. This brief but pivotal period included
investigation of how best to cheaply exploit the islands’ strategic and economic potential.
Following this period the Peel and Russell ministries shifted focus from developing
military uses for the islands to commercially guided colonization in the islands. As a
result, the second period of colonization from 1843 to 1851 saw the Falklands earn more
consideration from higher-ranking British officials, who generally nurtured economic
prospects like merchant ship refitting, cattle raising and fishing and whaling rather than
defense or local culture. Such attitudes led to misuse of the islands by absentee landlords
and speculative investors from the mid-1840s onward. The haphazard process that led to
this exploitation can be explained by the lack of preparation by the British government
for the aftermath of the takeover. The navy, called upon to create a Falklands settlement,
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lacked the resources and personnel to enforce sovereignty or order. Although the home
government considered advice from surveyors, merchants and diplomats, it largely failed
to assist in developing the settlement’s capacity, naval or otherwise, until 1843. Thus,
early naval stewards of the Falklands eked out survival with little direction or support
from parliament, the Admiralty or the rest of the cabinet.
Initially, the British had reason to occupy the islands without setting up a formal
colony, owing to regional and European politics. While prime ministers kept a watchful
eye on Continental proceedings, they generally tried to avoid entanglements with the
major European powers after 1815. Part of this ambiguous policy included not provoking
the ire of nations trying to regain lost territory. However, as liberalism grew in South
America after 1815 Iberian empires struggled unsuccessfully to stamp it out. Though
some cabinet members supported liberalism to further British trade, no ministry openly
backed the overthrow of monarchical institutions in Europe or South America. The
British government therefore proclaimed non-intervention, but backed British traders as
they set up shop in newly open markets. In essence, Britain’s ambiguous policies backed
commercial, but not formal political imperialism in South America. In the southwest
Atlantic, Britain’s naval and diplomatic support for the Monroe Doctrine allowed British
dominance in commerce and culture in port cities, but also allowed American and French
merchants to trade there as well. In the 1820s, the British gained the advantage by
recognizing the Argentine Confederation and negotiating favorable trade treaties. British
merchants dominated local banking and finance and overtook local industries in Buenos
Aires and Montevideo by pumping capital and cheaper wares into local markets. But
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unrest in these areas led to traders’ demands for protection by the British foreign
apparatus and the navy. Thus, the British began to seriously consider nearby island
bases, since mainland stations grew costlier and more entangling. Holding island bases
also reinforced British views of the navy as a reasonable and firm guarantor of safe
maritime commerce, seeing the navy as a reluctant guardian of threatened or interrupted
commercial interests.
The emergence of American and French competition in new South American
markets caused British leaders to react in order to protect Britain’s status as the region’s
trading and naval giant. Britain’s knee-jerk occupation of the remote (but favorably
situated) Falklands therefore seemed the most logical geopolitical option, given unrest on
the mainland and the growing volume of ships using the Horn route to the Pacific.
British leaders feared little retribution. The French had sold their rights to the islands to
Spain, the Americans only desired fishing rights, and the weak Argentine navy posed
almost no threat at all. Moreover, the Falklands hosted no aboriginal groups, only
criminals and deserters. Therefore, the Foreign Office ordered the Royal Navy to nab the
Falklands while the Lexington affair distracted the Argentines. After the dust settled,
Buenos Aires cried foul while the Americans and French offered no concrete opposition.
Immediately, British indecision over administration and rights to the Falklands
accompanied the takeover. Both Britain and Buenos Aires advanced questionable
theories of sovereignty, with the former claiming “prior discovery” and the latter
proclaiming rights to “territorial inheritance.” Debates within the British government
between cautious administrators and the more ambitious Foreign Office from 1829 to
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1833 prove that Britain acted more out of reaction to Argentine and American actions,
not for protection of ancient rights or desire to spread “Britishness.” Put off by Argentine
pretensions and the chance to lose the Falklands to mercantile competitors, Britain chose
to act impulsively and preemptively to occupy the islands. This decision led to perplexity
over governance among British cabinet members. Shared responsibilities between the
Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade and the Colonial Office in foreign and
colonial policy created confusion as to who made final decisions on occupying and
settling the islands. This overlap adversely affected the navy’s administrative ability. The
Admiralty and the South American Station in Rio de Janiero, receiving conflicting orders
and few material provisions, blamed cabinet self-interest and incompetence. Unable to
take decisive actions toward progress in the islands, high-ranking naval officers offered
only verbal backing, but spared little materiel for the Falklands’ naval stewards. As a
result, the islands’ bore gross neglect from 1833 to 1841. When civilian administrators
arrived, they gained only inconsistent support from 1843 to 1851 as Peel, Russell and the
Colonial Office adopted more Wakefieldian principles.
Britain’s inefficient colonization of the Falkland Islands between 1833 and 1851
shows the confusion of a nation coming to grips with its rapid growth of relative power in
the post-Napoleonic era. A growth in the number of wealthy industrialists and traders
looking for South American markets coincided with a formidable, but overextended
navy. While the former desired expansion into foreign markets to try to ease domestic
market saturation, the latter often possessed inadequate resources with which to fully
protect them. With France regaining its strength and the United States growing in
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commercial might, British leaders looked to promote informal dominance through trade
rather than annexation and colonization. Under the banners of “efficiency” and colonial
reform, British leaders and wealthy middle class traders endorsed “empire on the cheap”
or even privatization of colonization. This attitude caused leaders to ignore cultural
colonial development at the expense of boosting revenues. Such loyalty to commerce left
the small, unprofitable Falklands without an identity within the empire. Without proper
provisions or commitment from London, Falkland governors in the 1840s lacked the
ability to create proper defense or cultural development for the islanders.
The case of the Falklands’ colonization could have served as a cautionary tale
for future British colonization practices. Unbridled mercantile expansionism brought
about the return of increased formal acts of protection and imperialism by the British
government in the later 1800s. The early colonization of the Falklands shows that small
peripheral acquisitions like the Falklands functioned only to support the jewels of
Britain’s formal and informal empires. Moreover, the search for a niche for the Falklands
within British interests relates a dual narrative. It shows how impressively far Britain’s
commercial and naval prowess had extended by mid-century. But it also exposed the
reluctant commitment that often followed hasty imperial undertakings, owing to
shortsightedness, parliamentary thrift and unrealistic expectations for the navy. In this
way, the islands’ story of colonization from 1833 to 1851 proves that the burden and
breadth of Britain’s interests, both formal and informal, overwhelmed her power to
maintain them. Such foreign and colonial policies foreshadowed the rise and fall of the
nineteenth century’s greatest political, economic and cultural entity.
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